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ABSTRACT 
David L. Buehler: Enlargement of Preferential Trade Areas: Essays on Trade Displacement 
(Under the direction of Dr. Alfred Field) 
 
Trade displacement effects caused by the enlargement of a preferential trade area are 
examined in theory and empirically.  The Ricardian model of trade is expanded to four 
countries to show the trade and welfare effects on members and nonmembers caused by 
enlargement of a customs union.  A simulation follows to help clarify the results.  The 
enlargement of the European Union is examined through a dynamic shift-share analysis and 
the gravity model is employed to determine the significance of trade displacement.  The 
analysis demonstrates that trade displacement is likely to have occurred with the enlargement 
of the EU, but the significance of this displacement is not strong. 
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DISSERTATION INTRODUCTION 
The following collection of essays addresses the concept of trade displacement in 
international trade.  While the terms ‘trade creation’ and ‘trade diversion’ have existed since 
the 1950’s as part of the discussion of the trade effects of a customs union or preferential 
trade agreement, trade displacement has received less attention in the international trade 
literature.  Trade displacement occurs when an existing customs union expands to include 
new members and entails former members’ trade being displaced by the new members.  Each 
of the following essays addresses this effect in different ways. 
Trade displacement is first outlined in theory, using a Ricardian trade model adapted 
to four countries.  Using the Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson model of two-country trade 
and the Appleyard, Conway, and Field three-country model as a foundation, the Ricardian 
model is expanded to four countries in order to examine the possible enlargement of an 
existing customs union.  A fourth country is needed as there must exist a customs union (of at 
least two countries), an acceding country, and a country not included in the union.  This 
process of enlargement allows the identification of trade creation, trade diversion, and trade 
displacement as a result.  After the general equilibrium model is presented, a numerical 
simulation is presented, which allows a clearer picture of the various effects.  Welfare 
analysis in the theory and simulation also demonstrate the potential welfare effects of the 
enlargement process. 
The second chapter examines the export performance of the European countries over 
the last decade and a half.  Using export data, trade displacement would take place if the new 
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EU members exports to the existing members are taking the place of members’ exports to 
other members.  Using a shift-share analysis, export performance is examined after 
accounting for various other factors, including growth of world trade and market conditions.  
The analysis shows that the new EU members’ exports to the EU have increased fairly 
dramatically through the sample.  Conversely, some of the existing members’ exports to EU 
countries have decreased over the same time period. 
Rather than using export data, the final chapter examines import data to attempt to 
determine the existence of trade displacement.  In terms of imports, trade displacement 
occurs when a member of the customs union begins to import goods from a new member 
instead of an existing member.  The gravity model is employed to estimate the effects on 
trade from the different country groups – core members, other members, new members, and 
the rest of the world.  More importantly, the changes in these estimates from one period to 
the next are used to determine the changing nature of trade from the groups to the large EU 
countries.  Some evidence of trade displacement is presented, as the estimation shows 
increases in imports from the new members combined with decreases or smaller increases in 
imports from other members. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Trade Displacement in Theory: Evidence from the Ricardian Model 
I. Introduction 
There has been much theoretical work on the role of integration in international trade, 
but there has been relatively less work examining the growth of such trade agreements.  This 
paper will further develop the theoretical framework of international trade based on a 
Ricardian model as presented by Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (DFS), and later 
Appleyard, Conway, and Field (ACF).  The DFS model outlines the two-country model, and 
the ACF work extends the framework to three countries, which allows for the examination of 
different trade agreements between trade partners.  This paper adds a fourth country while 
utilizing the same theoretical framework.  The reason for this addition of a fourth country is 
to add the ability to consider countries potentially joining an existing trade agreement while 
others remain outside of the agreement.  With the addition of a fourth country to the model, 
this paper will also focus on the theoretical possibility of trade displacement occurring with 
the enlargement of a preferential trade agreement, in addition to trade creation and trade 
diversion as outlined by previous literature. 
Differing models of international trade suggest that the degree of similarity between 
partners has an effect of the gains (and costs) of economic integration.  In the Ricardian 
model, as evidenced by ACF, economic integration is most beneficial to those countries that 
are most dissimilar.  But while the three country model is capable of examining the different 
possible combinations of integration between countries, it lacks the ability to explore the 
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effects of potential enlargement of the area of integration on the current members and the 
remaining countries.  This four-country model allows for this investigation into the 
enlargement of an area of integration in terms of trade effects and welfare analysis, with a 
focus on trade creation, trade diversion, and trade displacement.  The model also permits 
comparison of potential accession countries, suggesting that current members could have 
different notions of which non-member should be allowed to integrate.  The model is 
examined with the enlargement of the European Union in mind, though it is presented more 
generally and is thus not restricted to that particular setting.  Ultimately, this paper seeks to 
answer the questions of how enlargement affects the welfare of current members of a 
customs union, the acceding country, and those not acceding.  
The paper is presented as follows:  Section 2 of the paper briefly presents existing literature 
on the subject.  The third section outlines the model used for analysis.  A brief description of 
the model and results from the two-country and three-country models is included before 
more detail is presented for the four-country case.  Section 4 presents the results of the four-
country model simulation, including a welfare analysis of the enlargement process.  Section 5 
concludes. 
II. Literature Review 
A. Overview 
The literature relating to the topics of trade creation, trade diversion, and trade 
displacement within the Ricardian model will be discussed in the following groups: general 
theoretical models of customs union1, work testing for evidence of the three effects, and 
previous versions of the Ricardian model.  The latter will be discussed in separate sections 
immediately following this section. 
                                                           
1
 For an excellent historical overview of this topic, see Panagariya (2000) 
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Discussion of literature on customs unions theory begins with Jacob Viner’s work 
The Customs Union Issue in 1950, in which Viner first outlines the terms trade creation and 
trade diversion. Viner’s work focused on the welfare effects of the creation of a customs 
union, and, as a general result, found trade creation – the movement of production from a 
high cost location to a lower cost location – to have a positive effect on global welfare, while 
trade diversion – the movement of production from a low cost producer to a high cost 
producer – has a negative effect on global welfare.  Viner’s work inspired a series of 
literature in the 1950’s including, but certainly not limited to, the works of James Meade, 
Franz Gehrels, and Richard Lipsey.  One of the main contributions of Lipsey’s work included 
the positive and negative consumption effects of customs union formation along with the 
production effects. 
These early works sparked debate to the merit and effectiveness of customs unions 
and preferential trade agreements.  Much of the policy debate centered around the choice of 
partners for a preferential trade agreement.  On opposite sides of one point of contention 
were Wonnacott and Lutz (1989) and Summers (1991), who suggested that large initial trade 
flows between potential PTA members would lead to a positive effect, as trade creation 
outweighed trade diversion.  Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) disputed this result, showing 
that high initial trade volumes do not necessarily suggest positive welfare effects for the 
member countries.  The debate continues today, with Eicher, Henn, and Papageorgiou (2008) 
“revisiting” the issue. 
Kemp and Wan’s (1976) work included the next significant theoretical outcome, as 
the authors demonstrated that one could always construct a welfare-improving customs union 
among countries while the non-members were left, at worst, at their initial levels of welfare.  
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Much like Viner’s work, this theory sparked a series of policy debates, as an important aspect 
of the Kemp-Wan conclusion relies on the reduction of the common external tariff of the 
customs union.   
The above list of works includes major contributions to the literature regarding 
customs unions.  However, many include only a discussion of the formation of customs 
unions or preferential trade agreements, and hardly touch on the subject of the enlargement 
of such an area.  One example that does briefly discuss this topic is Ronald Wonnacott’s 
1996 paper, in which the author mentions that the expansion of a customs union will reverse 
trade diversion caused by the initial formation of the union.  However, Wonnacott does not 
get into the details of the theory of this process as I attempt to.  Welfare effects of a joining 
nation have been sparsely addressed, with Williams (1972) leading the way.  I aim to 
examine the effects of the enlargement of a customs union – in terms of trade creation, 
diversion, and displacement – on initial members of a customs union, a joining member, as 
well as those not joining the customs union.  While the ideas of trade creation and trade 
diversion have existed in the literature since Viner, the theoretical literature on trade 
displacement is far more insubstantial.  
Attempts to empirically isolate the effects of trade creation and trade diversion 
typically involve the examination of one particular regional integration and/or one particular 
sector of trade. Few, however, address the issue of an expanding customs union or 
preferential trade agreement, and thus, few explore the significance of trade displacement 
effects of such an enlargement.  The work in this area is more recent, with Wilhelmsson 
(2006) examining the trade displacement effects of the expanding EU, and Fratianni and Oh 
(2007 & 2009) include expanding regional trade agreements in their analysis.  All three use 
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the gravity model to test the effects.  Wilhelmsson, in particular, specifically addresses the 
trade displacement effect through enlargement. 
Extensions of the Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (DFS) version of the Ricardian 
trade model are not new, but have also not lost influence or importance.  Various scholars 
continue to use the model as a basis for examination of various issues in international trade.  
More recent examples of the extensions of the model include several papers by Kiminori 
Matsuyama (2006), and the model also serves as the foundation for recent additions to 
international trade literature by John Romalis (2004).  Matsuyama has expanded the 
Ricardian model (and more specifically, the DFS model) in several different ways, including 
examining the inclusion of multiple factors and technologies dependent on destination (home 
or foreign), and also different demand preferences than the DFS model.  Romalis’ model is 
more along the lines of the Heckscher-Ohlin variety and addresses factor proportions and 
their role in trade, but the basis of the model begins with the DFS model.2 Other recent 
examples of DFS extensions include Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Alvarez and Lucas, Jr. 
(2006), which examine the role of geography in trade, as well as those of country size and 
tariff policy.   
Incorporating the modifications of these various authors into the discussion of 
regional integration would without doubt prove valuable as well.  Building off the original 
DFS model and addressing regional integration in the same manner as ACF, I will 
complement these various extensions of the Ricardian models by specifically addressing the 
enlargement of regional integration.  Before doing so, a brief review of the Ricardian model 
with a continuum of goods in the two and three country settings is presented. 
                                                           
2
 “The model is a combination of the Rudiger Dornbusch et al. (1980) model with a continuum of goods and the 
Krugman (1981) model of monopolistic competition and transport costs.” Romalis (2004). 
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B. The two-country Ricardian Model with a continuum of goods 
The Ricardian model with two countries and a continuum of goods, as outlined by 
Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (DFS), determines the competitive margin between 
exported and imported goods.  The model assumes constant unit labor requirements 
(Assumption 1) for all (n) commodities in both Country 1 and Country 2 (a1i and a2i; where i 
represents any good in the continuum).  The commodities are indexed so that they are ranked 
in order of diminishing comparative advantage for country 1, that is  
(1) 
 
 > ⋯ > 
 
 > ⋯ > 
 
  
In figure 1.1, this system of indexing, along with the wages in each country, produces the A 
curve, which draws the export incentive condition.  Along the A curve, Country 1 is 
indifferent between producing the good at home, costing a1iw1, or importing the good from 
Country 2, costing a2iw2 (given the absence of transportation costs and trade barriers, and 
assuming an exchange rate of 1).  To the left of the A curve, Country 1 has a comparative 
cost advantage, producing those goods at home for consumption as well as exporting them to 
Country 2.  Similarly, for those goods to the right of the A curve, Country 2 has a 
comparative cost advantage, and Country 1 chooses to import these goods. 
a1iw1< a2iw2 left of the A curve 
a1iw1 = a2iw2 along the A curve 
a1iw1> a2iw2 right of the A curve 
The other major determinants in the DFS general equilibrium are the assumptions of identical 
demands across countries and balanced trade, given by the equation 
(2) 
 = 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whererepresents the cumulative percentage of income spent on goods through zi.  Using 
 = 1 −  and rewriting, we have  
(3)  = 1 −   
 
The intersection of the cost advantage curve (A curve) and the balanced trade curve (C 
curve) results in the equilibrium wage ratio 	∗ and the crossover good z*.  At the 
equilibrium wage ratio, Country 1 produces and exports all goods closer to the origin than z*, 
while it imports all goods further from the origin than z*.   
Figure 1.1 – Two country Ricardian model 
z 
Adding tariffs to the two country model creates a third area of non-traded goods apart from 
exports and imports only as in the free trade case.  With tariffs in place on imports 
(reciprocally by both countries), there exists certain goods which Country 1 produces for 
consumption but does not export.  Likewise is true for Country 2.  These two cases (two 
country free trade and two country tariff case) will be examined further using a simulation 
later in the paper.  An important note is that the authors of the DFS paper explore several 
other scenarios outside of the tariff case in the two country setting.  While not critical to the 
  
A 
 
 
C 
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question at hand, they each have important implications and the reader should find detailed 
explanations in the original DFS paper. 
C. The three-country Ricardian model with a continuum of goods 
The expansion to three countries, as presented by Appleyard, Conway, and Field 
(ACF), allows for examination of the effects of trade agreements between pairs of countries.  
The model is built in a similar fashion to the two country model, indexing the continuum of 
goods between 0 and 1, and decreasing in terms of country 1’s comparative advantage.  
However, it is important to note that there are essentially two A curves, with 
A2(z)=a2(z)/a1(z) and A3(z)=a3(z)/a1(z), that map out cost advantages with the respective 
wage ratios.  Combining the comparative cost advantages and a balanced trade restriction, we 
again see that each country specializes in the production of a set of goods and exports these 
goods in exchange for each of the other countries’ goods.  The crossover goods, of which 
there are two in the three-country setting, are determined by the indexed good where it is 
cheaper to produce it in country 2 than in country 1 (z1*) and the indexed good where it is 
cheaper to produce it in country 3 than in country 2 (z2*).  Figure 1.2 shows the equilibrium 
for the three-country, free trade case for a general production function.  The introduction of 
tariffs again creates sets of goods (two of them) that are produced for home consumption but 
not traded. 
The introduction of the third country allows, among other things, the analysis of trade 
agreements between certain members.  The policies of one or more countries have effects on 
the direction of trade, the terms of trade, and the welfare of all three nations (the entire world 
in this case).   However, in the three country model, enlargement of a trade agreement to 
include a non-member would result in the free trade case, as all countries in the model would 
11 
 
be a member of the union.  A fourth country is needed to analyze countries not included in 
the enlargement process. 
Figure 1.23 - Three country Ricardian model 
 
 
 
III. The four-country Ricardian model with a continuum of goods 
A. General Model / Free trade 
Four countries are denoted Ci, with i = 1, 2, 3, or 4.  An arrayed number of goods are 
produced (and consumed) and each good is positioned along the continuum [0,1] by variable 
z.
4
  Following ACF, the following assumptions are made about technology, which shows 
through the labor-output ratio ai(z).  For Ai(z)=ai(z)/a1(z): 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 In the three-country free trade case, there are four equations that must be satisfied: two (binding) export 
conditions and two balanced trade equations. In the figure, the export condition for C1, which determines z1*, 
has been substituted into the other three equations, and those equations are represented by the three planes in the 
figure. The intersection of the three planes represents the general equilibrium of z1*, z2*, and (w1/w3)*.  
(w1/w2)* = A2(z1*) is not represented in the figure.  
 
4
 A specific production function will be introduced in the numerical simulation.  See equation 46 on page 25. 
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(4)    
! = α < 0 
(5) $$   
! = α% < 0 
(6) &&   
! = α' < 0 
(7) 
α' < α% < α < 0 
 
The first assumption is a standard assumption in the two-country case ensuring the ability to 
order the commodities in terms of comparative advantage.  Adding Assumptions 2-4 ensures 
that  Ai(z)/Aj(z) is increasing in z for j≤i.  All together, the assumptions mean that 
comparative advantage, as z increases, shifts toward countries with a higher i under the 
assumption that national skill level increases from C1 to C2 to C3 and to C4.5 
Countries will import a good from another country if it is more expensive to produce it at 
home, and likewise, they will have a comparative advantage and export goods for which the 
country is the lowest-cost producer6.  For i = 2,3,4, define the wage ratio Ωi = w1/wi. Then 
country i will export goods z for which the following holds for j ≠ i: 
(8) 
( ≤ 
** 
                                                           
5
 See ACF (1989) for example of production involving skill-based technology.  
 
6
 With costs of production of aiwi in each respective country, there is an implicit assumption that every good on 
the continuum is produced using identical factor intensities, i.e. labor is equally productive in every industry.   
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The parameter e represents the international exchange rate.7 
These descriptions of comparative advantage define crossover goods z1, z2, and z3, 
given by the following equations: 
(9) 
Ω = +,-. 
(10) 
Ω
Ω% = /+,-.+%,-.0 
(11) 
Ω%
Ω' = /+%,-%.+',-%.0 
 
For values below z1, country 1 produces and exports to all three trading partners.  Likewise, 
country 2 produces goods between z1 and z2 and exports to all three partners.  For goods 
between z2 and z3, country 3 is the exporter, and for goods above z3, country 4 is the 
exporter. 
At this moment, it is important to note the role that the Ω’s play in this model.  
Changes in these real wage ratios have an impact on the location in the continuum of the 
crossover good.  As ACF (1989) states, “The real wage ratios can be interpreted as trade-
weighted averages of the commodity terms of trade.” Hence, when we get away from a free 
trade situation, policy (tariffs) will not only play a direct role in affecting the location of 
crossover goods and thus the pattern of trade, but also have an indirect effect through the 
terms of trade.  This is an important note, as partial equilibrium models often ignore this 
indirect effect.  These effects will become clearer in the next example. 
The fact that the wage ratios, combined with the unit labor costs, determine the prices 
of the goods produced demonstrates the perfectly competitive nature of the model.  Perfect 
                                                           
7
 The exchange rate will not be influential in the current model, and is assumed to hold a value of 1. Future 
work may include analysis of the effects of exchange rate policy on the model. 
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competition in the labor markets implies constant wages across the different industries (but 
not across countries).  As far as the output markets, the prices of the goods are determined by 
the wages and technology, implying perfectly competitive output markets as well – resulting 
in the continuum of goods being dubbed a ‘continuum of competitive industries’8 as well.  
Foreign goods and domestic goods are perfect substitutes, as consumers decide where to 
purchase goods from based solely on price, and the production results in marginal cost 
pricing of the goods.  Full employment is an additional assumption that is also included in 
the model. 
Conway (2001) is one example of the DFS model extended with relaxed assumptions 
in the industrial organization.  A Ricardo-Viner (RV) model is introduced in comparison to 
the more traditional DFS model, and firms earn positive profits in this imperfectly 
competitive model.  Some of the important results of this alternate assumption include home 
wages that are dependent on foreign wages and firms from each country capturing profits 
according to the difference in relative productivity.  Conway also examines an alternative to 
the full employment assumption.  Results of this comparison show the importance of the 
perfect competition assumption, as the imperfectly competitive RV model demonstrates 
opposite results from the DFS model in the case of movement of the z values – a critical 
aspect of the examination of trade policy shocks in the DFS framework. 
Following both ACF and DFS using a Mill demand construction, the per capita welfare 
function of country i is 
(12) 
1 = 2 34 ,-.5,6.7-/ 
                                                           
8
 Matsuyama (2006) 
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where Li is the labor force of country iand Ei(z) is the real expenditure on good z in country i. 
Expenditure on each commodity is a constant share b(z) of total expenditure and is identical 
across countries.  The function b(z) is assumed to be strictly positive, and integration on the 
continuum of goods (for 0 to 1) results in unity.  Hence, the demand side of the model 
follows the traditional, uniform homothetic DFS assumptions that all consumers have 
identical Cobb-Douglas preferences over the continuum of goods and implies that the 
fraction of expenditure spent on a subset of goods is θ(zi) and is defined by the equation: 
(13) 
,-. = 2 9,-.7-6:4 > 0 
Matsuyama (2000) and Stibora and de Vaal and (2007) demonstrate the results of relaxing 
these assumptions of the traditional DFS model.  By altering the continuum of goods such 
that higher income household purchase a larger variety of goods (which can be interpreted as 
necessity and luxury goods), the introduction of non-homothetic preferences demonstrates 
that within-country income distributions will affect the import and export equilibrium values.   
Returning to the traditional assumption of homothetic preferences, trade balance conditions 
are also needed in this equilibrium model, and these represent the simultaneous demand of all 
countries.  Trade balances in the form of imports set to equal exports are given in equations 
14 through 17.9 
(14) ;1 − ,-.< = ,-.; + %% + ''< 
(15) ;,-. + ,1 − ,-..< = ,,-. − ,-..; + %% + ''< 
 
                                                           
9
 Only three of the four are needed.  In the tariff example, we will eliminate the trade balance equation for 
country 3. 
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(16) ;,-. + ,1 − ,-%..<%% = ,,-%. − ,-..; +  + ''< 
(17) ,-%.'' = ,1 − ,-%..; +  + %%< 
 
Defining li = Li/L1 and simplifying our notation with: 
(18)  = ,-. 
we can give normalized trade balance equations in the form: 
(19) 
1 =  >1 + ?
Ω + ?%Ω% + ?'Ω'@ 
(20) 
1 = , − . >1 + Ω? + ?%Ω%Ω? + ?'Ω'Ω? @ 
(21) 
1 = ,% − . >1 + Ω%?% + ?ΩΩ%?% + ?'Ω'Ω%?% @ 
(23) 
1 = ,1 − %. >1 + Ω'?' + ?ΩΩ'?' + ?%Ω%Ω'?' @ 
 
The equations defining the crossover goods (14-17) combined with the balanced trade 
equations (19-23) define independent relationships between the variables z1, z2, z3, Ω2, Ω3, 
and Ω4. The implicit function theorem allows a joint solution of the six endogenous variables 
and results in the following signs of partial derivatives: 
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A-A? < 0, A-A?% < 0, A-A?' < 0, 
A-A? > 0, A-A?% < 0, A-A?' < 0, 
A-%A? > 0, A-%A?% > 0, A-%A?' < 0, 
A-A? > 0, A-A?% < 0, A-A?' < 0, 
AΩA? > 0, AΩA?% > 0, AΩA?' > 0, 
AΩ%A? 				?,									AΩ%A?% > 0, AΩ%A?' 				?, 
AΩ'A? 					?, AΩ'A?% 					?, AΩ'A?' > 0, 
Before introducing tariffs into the model, a common misconception about the continuum of 
goods needs to be addressed.  The four-country free trade model results in a trade pattern 
illustrated by figure 1.3, with each country specializing in the goods in their respective region 
of the continuum.10 
Figure 1.3 – Trade pattern for four country free trade 
 
 
The Ricardian model is sometimes criticized because it lacks intra-industry trade, and 
there is little empirical evidence that supports complete specialization.  These criticisms 
spawned several new theories of international trade, including, but certainly not limited to, 
                                                           
10
 C1 exports [0,z1] to the other three countries. Likewise, C2 exports [z1,z2], C3 exports [z2,z3] and C4 exports 
[z3,1].  The figure is not to scale, and the size of the respective regions is determined by other parameters in the 
model. 
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Krugman’s model which specifically addressed intra-industry trade.  However, the notion of 
complete specialization in this Ricardian model with a continuum of goods can include intra-
industry trade. 
 In this model, complete specialization only implies that a country produces only the 
goods which it can produce at a lower cost than any other country.  However, it does not 
imply that two countries cannot produce the same type of good.  By the construction of the 
model and the indexing of goods along the continuum from 0 to 1, there is no restriction that 
two goods from the same industry must be at the same point on the continuum.  It is certainly 
possible for one good from an industry to be indexed at a different point than another good 
from the same industry.  For example, one type of automobile may be indexed very close to 
0, meaning it lies in the region in which C1 is likely to have a comparative cost advantage. 
Another type of automobile may lie closer to 1 on the index, implying a C1 comparative cost 
disadvantage.  C1 is therefore likely to export the first type of automobile, while it is likely to 
import the second.  The ability to include intra-industry trade in the model is a result of the 
level of disaggregation of the goods along the continuum.  If the goods are sufficiently 
disaggregated, then slightly different goods, which might normally be considered from the 
same industry, will be represented at different points on the continuum.  In fact, as long as 
the goods are more disaggregated than the level of aggregation that the term ‘industry’ 
implies, then the model can include this type of trade.  Hence, from this point on, we will 
assume that the goods in production (all goods produced in the world), are at a minimum 
level of disaggregation as to include intra-industry trade. 
 An example of this disaggregation would be the difference between the various levels 
of aggregation according to the number of digits in the Standard International Trade 
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Classification (SITC).  The level of product homogeneity is very different and more 
homogenous at the SITC 4-digit level than at the SITC 1-digit level.    Therefore, at the 4-
digit level, it is more likely that two products with different SITC classifications may be part 
of the same ‘industry’ and could be represented at two different points on the continuum.  
For example, comparing apples (SITC 0574) to oranges (SITC 0571), it’s likely that a 
country would have different cost advantages in their production resulting in different places 
along the continuum of goods.  However, both could easily be considered part of the same 
industry of fruits and vegetables (SITC 05).  It should be noted that, through the modification 
to imperfect competition, Krugman’s model allows for intra-industry trade regardless of the 
level of disaggregation that the term ‘industry’ implies.   
 This description of the disaggregation needed is an important distinction in this model 
and has important implications in the interpretation of product specialization and trade 
patterns.  For one, the Ricardian model does not restrict intra-industry trade, so the notion of 
complete specialization only implies production of goods for which a country has a 
comparative advantage, but not the production of goods from a limited subset of all 
industries.  Second, the expansion (contraction) of region of the continuum that a country 
exports means that a country does produce a greater (smaller) variety of goods, but it also 
implies that the volume of trade increases (decreases).   
B. Introduction of tariffs 
Straying from the free trade model, we can form a similar, more general model with 
each country levying a tariff on the other three trading partners.  The tariffs are assumed to 
take the form of a uniform ad valorem tariff on all imports coming into the country.  Define 
tij as the ad valorem tariff levied by country i on imports from country j, so 
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(24) D* = ,1 + E*. 
Such tariffs will impact the pattern of trade as well as the real wage ratios, or the terms of 
trade, as demand shifts due to the changes in prices (with tariffs).  Countries will now import 
from the producer with the cheapest tariff-inclusive price.  For k ≠ i (k = j is permissible, but 
τjj = 1), country i will export to country j if and only if 
(25) D*
 ≤ D*F
FF 
For each potential trade partner, three inequalities must hold.  Consider, for example, country 
1’s exports to country 2.  The exports from country 1 to 2, tariff inclusive, must be cheaper 
than country 2 producing at home, so τ21a1w1≤a2w2.  In addition, exports from country 1 to 2 
must be cheaper, tariff inclusive, than exports from country 3 or 4, so τ21a1w1≤ τ23a3w3 and 
τ21a1w1≤ τ24a4w4.  Hence, with four countries, three partners each, and three inequalities, 
there are a total of 36 inequalities.  Of these inequalities, twelve are binding and define 
twelve crossover goods.  However, in some cases, which inequality is binding will be 
determined by the level of tariffs.  For example, examine z8, which determines the good that 
is as cheap to produce at home in C2 as it is to import from C3.  But if τ23 is significantly 
more than τ24, then there might not exist any goods that are cheaper for C2 to import from C3 
rather than C4.  The crossover goods are defined by equations 26 to 37, along with the other 
inequalities that need to hold.  The inequality in bold type is the binding inequality when 
tariffs are equal and not prohibitive. 
 
(26a, 26b, 26c) 
GHIJH ≤ KH,LI.;		DΩ% ≤ D%+%,-.	; 		DΩ' ≤ D'+',-. 
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(27a, 27b, 27c) 
GNIJH ≤ GNHKH,LH.;		D%Ω% ≤ +%,-.	; 		D%Ω' ≤ D%'+',-. 
(28a, 28b, 28c) 
GOIJH ≤ GOHKH,LN.	; 		D'Ω% ≤ D'%+%,-%.	; 		D'Ω' ≤ +',-%. 
(29a, 29b, 29c) 
GIHKH,LO. ≤ JH	; 		D /+,-'.+%,-'.0 ≤ D% ΩΩ%	; 		D /+,-'.+',-'.0 ≤ D' ΩΩ' 
(30a, 30b, 30c) 
D%+,-P. ≤ ΩD%	; 		GNH /KH,LQ.KN,LQ.0 ≤ JHJN	; 	D% /+,-P.+',-P.0 ≤ D%' ΩΩ' 
(31a, 31b, 31c) 
D'+,-R. ≤ ΩD'	; 		GOH /KH,LS.KN,LS.0 ≤ GON JHJN	;		D' /+,-R.+',-R.0 ≤ ΩΩ' 
(32a, 32b, 32c) 
D%+%,-T. ≤ Ω%	; 		GIN /KN,LU.KH,LU.0 ≤ GIH JNJH ;		D% /+%,-T.+',-T.0 ≤ D' Ω%Ω' 
(33a, 33b, 33c) 
D%+%,-V. ≤ DΩ%	; 		GHN /KN,LW.KH,LW.0 ≤ JNJH ;		D% /+%,-V.+',-V.0 ≤ D' Ω%Ω' 
(34a, 34b, 34c) 
D'%+%,-X. ≤ D'Ω%	; 		D'% /+%,-X.+,-X.0 ≤ D' Ω%Ω		; 		GON /KN,LY.KO,LY.0 ≤ JNJO 
(35a, 35b, 35c) 
D'+',-4. ≤ Ω'	; 		D' /+',-4.+,-4.0 ≤ D Ω'Ω	; 		GIO /KO,LIZ.KN,LIZ.0 ≤ GIN JOJN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(36a, 36b, 36c) 
D'+',-. ≤ DΩ'	; 	D' /+',-.+,-.0 ≤ Ω'Ω	; 		GHO /KO,LII.KN,LII.0 ≤ GHN JOJN 
(37a, 37b, 37c) 
D%'+',-. ≤ D%Ω'	; 	D%' /+',-.+,-.0 ≤ D% Ω'Ω	; 	GNO /KO,LIH.KN,LIH.0 ≤ JOJN 
 
The resulting trade patterns are indicated in Figure 1.4.11,12 A few important notes are 
needed.  Each country continues to produce in the general region of the continuum as in the 
free trade example; that is, country 1 produces the goods with low z values, while country 4 
produces those goods with high z values.  The tariffs have also caused a region of non-traded 
goods for each country.  Comparison to the free trade example also lends itself to interesting 
outcomes.  With each τ = 1, then z1 = z2 = z3 = z4.  Likewise for zi for i = 5, 6, 7, and 8 or i = 
9, 10, 11, 12.   
 
 
                                                           
11
 There is potential for zi< zi+1, but that is not necessarily a problem.  Some z values may cross over one 
another, while others can not.  In general, z values can not cross over if doing so results in a country both 
importing and exporting a good.  If this occurs, then the binding inequality is not the correct one of the three 
export conditions. Correcting the binding inequality will disallow both importing and exporting the same goods.    
 
12
 Please note that a z13 corresponds to a value of 1, or the upper end of the continuum of goods. 
23 
 
 
The tariff-inclusive per capita welfare functions are 
(26) 
1 = 2 [ 9,-.
,-.\
5,6.6&
4 7- +	2 [ 9,-.]
,-.D\
5,6.6^
6& 7- + 2 [
9,-.]%
%,-.D%\
5,6.6	_
6^ 7-
+ 2 > 9,-.]'
',-.D'@
5,6.
6	_ 7- 
 
Figure 1.2 – Trade pattern for four country, tariff case 
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(27) 
1 = 2 > 9,-.]
,-.D@
5,6.6	
4 7- +	2 > 9,-.
,-.@
5,6.6`
6	 7- +2 >
9,-.]%]
%,-.D%@
5,6.6		
6` 7-
+ 2 > 9,-.]']
',-.D'@
5,6.
6		 7- 
(28) 
1% = 2 > 9,-.]%
,-.D%@
5,6.6
4 7- +	2 > ]9,-.]%
,-.D%@
5,6.6a
6 7- + 2 >
9,-.
%,-.@
5,6.6	
6a 7-
+ 2 > 9,-.]']%
',-.D%'@
5,6.
6	 7- 
(29) 
1' = 2 > 9,-.]'
,-.D'@
5,6.6$
4 7- +	2 > ]9,-.]'
,-.D'@
5,6.6b
6$ 7- + 2 >
9,-.]%]'
%,-.D'%@
5,6.6c
6b 7-
+ 2 > 9,-.
',-.@
5,6.
6c 7- 
 
 
which include the optimal demand condition for country i of Ei(zk)/Li = b(zk)wi/Pi(zk) for all 
k and the constant returns pricing condition Pi(zk) = aj(zk)wjτij for all goods zk produced in 
country j, for j = 1,2,3, or 4 (recall, if i=j, then τij =1).  The consumer faces the tariff-
inclusive cost of production of the country with comparative advantage. 
Trade balance equations are again needed, and the normalized equations are:13,14 
 
                                                           
13
 As noted earlier, only three of the four countries are required.  Country 3 is omitted. 
 
14
 It is assumed that importers pay the tariff and the government redistributes the revenue equally.   
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(30) 
1 = θ l
Ω + θ l%Ω% + θ% l'Ω' + θ' 
(31) 
1 = ,θT − θ'.Ωl + ,θR − θ%. l'Ω'Ωl + ,θP − θ. l%Ω%Ωl + ,θV − θ. 
(32) 
1 = ,1 − θ. l%
Ω%
Ω'l' + ,1 − θ. lΩΩ'l' + ,1 − θ4.Ω'l' + ,1 − θX. 
 
As we approach policy or tariff reform, we are interested in the effects on the trade 
patterns of changes in tariffs.  The changes in the position of the crossover goods are given 
by equations 33 to 44.  Recall that by the assumptions outlined, α2< 0, α2 – α3> 0, and α3 – 
α4> 0.  The direct impact of tariff reduction is much clearer, as an increase or decrease in the 
z value of a crossover good will affect the exports and imports of countries on either side of 
the good. 
(33) zf =  1
α ,τ̂ + Ωh. 
(34) zf =  1
α ,τ̂% − τ̂% + Ωh. 
(35) zf% =  1
α ,τ̂' − τ̂' + Ωh. 
(36) zf' =  1
α ,−τ̂ + Ωh. 
(37) zfP =  1
α − α% ,−τ̂% + Ωh − Ωh%. 
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(38) zfR =  1
α − α% ,τ̂'% − τ̂' + Ωh − Ωh%. 
(39) zfT =  1
α − α% ,τ̂% − τ̂ +Ωh − Ωh%. 
(40) zfV =  1
α − α% ,τ̂% + Ωh − Ωh%. 
(41) zfX =  1
α% − α' ,−τ̂'% + Ωh% − Ωh'. 
(42) zf4 =  1
α% − α' ,τ̂' − τ̂% + Ωh% −Ωh'. 
(43) zf =  1
α% − α' ,τ̂' − τ̂% + Ωh% − Ωh'. 
(44) zf =  1
α% − α' ,τ̂%' + Ωh% − Ωh'. 
 
It is also clear that the changes in the real wage ratios have an effect on the location of 
a crossover good in the continuum.  Now, the indirect effect of a change in tariff is also 
evident, as a change in tariff has an effect on the real wage ratio.   
A customs union changes several values in the model.  First, the internal tariffs are 
removed.  Second, member countries must adopt a common tariff to the non-union countries.  
For example, consider a union between countries 3 and 4.   Internal tariffs are removed, so 
τ34 and τ43 are both unitary.  This will have a direct negative effect on z6 and z12 (because of 
the positive relationship and a reduction in tariff), while it has a direct positive effect on z9. 
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In addition, other direct effects will be determined by the level of common external tariff the 
union levies on non-members.  If the two union countries had differing tariff rates on a non-
member prior to joining, then at least one of their tariffs must be changed, though which 
tariff and which direction is uncertain.  Continuing with example, the non-traded sectors of 
C3 and C4 are eliminated, as z9 = z10 = z11 = z12 through the combination of the elimination of 
the internal tariff and the harmonization of the external tariff.  The indirect effects also 
change the crossover values through the changes in the terms of trade.  
To continue with the union of countries 3 and 4, with the elimination of the internal 
tariff, Country 3 has expanded its exports (on the low-end side) to country 4 (z6 decreases 
and is equal to z5).  If country 2 is the candidate country, then the elimination of the union’s 
external tariff on country 2 could have effects that reverse the movement caused by the 
original formation of the union.  This is the case, as country 2 expands exports of its high end 
(which is 3’s low end) to country 4 at the loss or reduction of country 3’s exports to country 
4.  We also get the same value of zi for i = 5, 6, 7, and 8. The indirect effects must be taken 
into account to correctly identify the direction of the movement of the crossover goods, and 
the current lack of these effects require caution in interpreting these results.  This example is 
one of many possible scenarios for customs unions and enlargement in this model. 
Before discussing the particular trade effects of enlargement, an important note on the 
welfare functions described by equations 26 through 29 must be made.  In this model, 
welfare is measure of the per capita incomes brought on by the trade pattern and relative 
wages of the countries.  The model discussed in this paper focuses on these parameters – the 
z parameters, which influence the pattern of trade, and the Ω values, which represent relative 
wages – and their influence on income changes.  It would be naïve, however, to state that 
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these are the only effects of enlargement.  Certainly, other effects such as increased FDI 
flows are likely to have an effect on overall welfare of a country in addition to the effects 
discussed in this model.15  However, this paper will discuss changes in welfare that are 
isolated to the income changes brought on by changes in trade patterns and relative wages. 
Trade Creation, Trade Diversion, and Trade Displacement 
 With the model now complete, trade creation, trade diversion, and trade displacement 
effects can be seen.  The definitions of these terms will be similar to those in Viner’s original 
work for trade creation and diversion, and similar to Wilhelmson’s for trade displacement. 
 Trade creation is defined by the movement of production from a high-cost producer 
to a low-cost producer due to a reduction in trade barriers.  This is considered to be a positive 
welfare effect for both countries involved, as both countries face lower prices for a number of 
goods produced by the other country.  Higher-cost home production is replaced by lower-cost 
foreign production after tariffs are reduced.   
Trade diversion occurs when production of a good relocates from a low-cost producer 
to a high-cost producer due to the preferred status of one country over another.  In terms of a 
customs union, the production of a good relocates from a lower-cost non-member to a 
higher-cost member country.  The move away from more efficient producers is expected to 
have a negative welfare effect, although it will vary by country.  The non-member from 
which trade is diverted from will certainly have a negative welfare change.  While trade 
diversion likely will result in a welfare decrease due to this movement away from efficient 
producers, it is possible that global welfare might increase if the consumption effects are very 
large and outweigh the negative production effects. 
                                                           
15
 See Motta and Norman (1996) and MacDermott (2006) for discussions on the relationship between regional 
trade agreements and FDI. 
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Trade displacement is defined by the movement of production from a high-cost 
member country to a low-cost new member country.  For example, suppose there are two 
countries, A and B, which are members of a customs union with no trade barriers between 
the two.  If another country, C, joins the union, it might now be able to export goods to 
country A for a cheaper price than country B.  Essentially, country B’s exports (to A) now 
face increased competition from country C.  Trade displacement can also partially be 
interpreted as a reduction or reversal of trade diversion.  Overall, the movement to a more 
efficient producer should lead to a net positive welfare effect.  However, welfare effects will 
again vary both in magnitude and direction by country.  Identifying these varying effects by 
country is one of the goals of this paper.  
These three effects also show why expanding the model to four countries is 
necessary. Trade creation occurs whenever two countries reduce trade barriers between one 
another.  The two country model (DFS) accounts for this, as the welfare gains from moving 
from the base tariff case to free trade are all a result of trade creation.  The three country 
model (ACF) and this four country model also account for trade creation.  To examine the 
effects of trade diversion, however, the model must also include a country that is not a 
member of the customs union.  Hence, the three country model, as well as the four country 
model, can account for trade diversion while the two country model cannot.  Examining the 
effects of trade displacement requires analyzing the changes when a country becomes a 
member of the customs union.  The three country model can somewhat examine this effect, 
however, enlargement of any customs union results in all countries becoming members.  
Without any countries outside of the union, there is no longer a way to examine trade 
diversion.  Hence, this four country model can be used to simultaneously examine trade 
30 
 
creation, trade diversion, and trade displacement, as all requirements are met – two countries 
forming a union, a country remaining outside of the union, and a country joining the union. 
In the four country model, the formation of a two country customs union creates both trade 
creation and trade diversion.  Much of the trade creation effect can be seen in the reduction of 
the region of non-traded goods of the countries that form the union.  The member countries 
increase trade with one another in every case.  After the elimination of trade barriers for the 
members, there is no longer a region of non-traded goods, as if it is cheaper to produce a 
good in one country, then the other member will import that particular good.  Since all goods 
in the world are exchanged and consumed, that is, every country consumes the entire 
continuum, the reduction of tariffs will increase trade.  However, the increase in trade as a 
result of a customs union is both trade creating and trade diverting.  The difference between 
the two can be determined by exploring the cheapest production of the good at a particular 
location of the continuum.  At this point, the general equilibrium nature of this model makes 
this slightly more difficult.  Which goods are traded among which countries has an effect on 
the wage ratios and terms of trade.  The wage ratios then determine, along with other 
parameters, which country is the cheapest producer of goods.  Ultimately the cheapest 
producer will be the country for which aciwc is the lowest.  So trade creation can been seen in 
the movement from a higher cost of production to a lower cost of production.  In most cases, 
this is a move from home production and consumption without exporting prior to a customs 
union to exporting all goods in production. 
The trade diversion effects of the formation of a customs union can be seen as a 
movement from low to high cost production.  After trade barriers between the two members 
are eliminated, trade diversion takes place if a member country imports goods from the other 
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member country that it was previously importing from elsewhere.16 Hence, trade diversion 
takes place whenever  
(45)
 
 ≤ D*F
FF ≤ D*
 
as country j imports from country i after the elimination of tariffs (D*. but had previously 
imported from country k, assuming that τjk = τjl. 
 Trade creation and trade diversion occur with the formation of a customs union.  
When that union has a new member enter, trade displacement also takes place.  Moving from 
a two country union to a three country union affects each country in the model in different 
combinations of trade creation, trade diversion, and trade displacement.  For the purposes of 
the model, there are two member countries, an accession country, and a non-member 
country.17  Each of the two members will experience trade creation with the accession 
country, as well as trade displacement as the new member might replace some of the member 
countries’ exports to the other member.  The non-member will experience trade diversion as 
it experiences a loss of exports to the accession country, which now imports those goods 
from one of the two members.  The accession country will experience all three effects.  Trade 
creation will occur with both members, trade diversion will take place as it changes its source 
of imports from the non-member to one of the two members, and trade displacement will 
occur as it becomes the source of imports for one member instead of the other member 
country. 
 In more general terms, trade displacement will occur when: 

mm ≤ 
nmn5monmn5mo ≤ D*,m
mm 
                                                           
16
 The source of imports may change solely due to the changes in the changing wage ratios resulting from the 
changes in trade between the members, but this is the more general definition of trade diversion. 
 
17
 The non-member can also be interpreted as the rest of the world (ROW). 
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Where j is either of the member countries, member is the other member, and new is the new 
member country.  The new member is the low cost producer of the good (the first part of the 
inequality), yet prior to enlargement, had not been the source of imports (the second part) due 
to the preferential agreement between the two members.  The displacement effect will be 
positive for the new member and one of the members (country j), but negative for the other 
member (member).  The displacement costs are seen in reduced exports for the other 
member. 
 As described in the above model, trade displacement occurs because of the change in 
the relative prices of the goods.  The costs of production also change due to the change in the 
relative wages, a result of trade remaining balanced according to equations 30-32.  For a 
moment, consider a situation where the relative wages do not change as a result in the change 
of tariff policy toward the new members.  In this hypothetical, the only thing that would 
change is the tariff-inclusive price paid by consumers.  If, prior to enlargement, goods are 
being imported to a member country from another member – meaning the price is the cost of 
production in the other member – yet neither is the lowest-cost producer, then there is the 
potential for trade displacement.  Trade displacement occurs after enlargement if the member 
begins to import from the new member rather than the other member because consumers can 
now purchase the goods relatively cheaper from the new member.  This effect reflects the 
changes in the trade pattern due to direct price changes. 
 The changes in the relative wages, however, also have an effect on the pattern of 
trade, as discussed with the indirect effects (as seen in equations 33-44).  These changes in 
relative wages can cause changes in production costs, which, in turn, can change the source 
of imports for the countries in the model.  Thus, trade displacement occurs because of 
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changing trade patterns, which is a result of direct price effects as well as indirect relative 
wage effects.  Not all changes in the trade pattern, however, would be considered trade 
displacement – only those in which the new member replaces a member as the source of 
goods for another member. 
In terms of welfare, the three effects will impact the countries differently through the 
enlargement of the customs union.  The two members experience trade creation with the 
accession country, which is expected to have a positive effect on their welfare.  However, 
each member will also experience trade displacement away from it, which will be a negative 
welfare effect.  Trade displacement away from a member implies that the accession country’s 
exports have replaced some of the member’s exports to the other member, and the lost 
income – and the lost imports as a result – produce the negative effects. So the net result on 
the two members is ambiguous, as the magnitude of the effects will determine the final 
result.  The non-member only experiences trade diversion away from it – reduced exports to 
the members - and is expected to therefore have a negative welfare effect as a result of the 
customs union enlargement.  The accession country experiences trade creation, trade 
diversion toward it – increased exports to the members (at the loss of the non-member) – as 
well as trade displacement toward it – increased exports to the either member which replace 
exports from one member to the other.  All three effects will result in welfare gains for the 
accession country.  The overall world welfare will be determined by the net changes to all 
four countries.  Since the enlargement of the customs union is in general a reduction in trade 
barriers and a movement toward free trade, one might expect the net world welfare to 
increase.18 
                                                           
18
 In the general sense, this is true.  However, there are a number of examples which this might not hold. 
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 The role of country size in the model is another aspect which could have dramatic 
effects on the results of the enlargement process.  In the general form, the expectations of 
changing relative sizes of countries are similar to the results found in DFS.  Assuming that 
there are no economies of scale present in larger countries, increases in the relative size of a 
foreign country would drive up the wages of the other countries relative to the now-larger 
country and also increase the relative share of goods produced by the larger country.  Hence, 
an increase in the size of C2 would drive the wages of the other countries up relative to C2 
while the goods produced by C2 would expand.  As the goods nearest the crossover goods 
would be most affected, the effects on C1 and C3 would be more dramatic than the effects on 
C4 and would be where possible trade displacement has taken place.  As in DFS, the country 
with increasing population would have a decrease in per capita welfare, as the increase in the 
range of goods produced does not outweigh the decrease in wages. 
 As part of the discussion of customs union enlargement, and more specifically trade 
creation, diversion, and displacement effects, the role of country size could increase or 
decrease the magnitude of these effects depending on whether the larger country is a 
member, the accession country, or non-member.  In the particular case of the accession 
country being a relatively larger country than the others, the country’s inclusion in an 
existing customs union could possibly have more dramatic effects on the pattern of trade.  If 
the accession country is larger than the members, it would reason that the members would 
gain more (or be hurt less) by its inclusion.  This result would be expected because the 
members would have greater access to cheaper goods – as the wage in the accession country 
is driven down by a larger population, so are the goods it produces. At the same time, the 
accession country now produces a larger set of goods, potentially directly competing even 
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more with a member country’s production.  However, the welfare gain for the members 
caused by the ability to purchase cheaper goods is expected to outweigh the loss caused by a 
reduction in exported goods.  In this sense, the magnitude of trade displacement that occurs 
may be greater if the accession country is larger, but the overall welfare effects will be 
positive (or less negative). 
 Another possibility for country size affecting the trade displacement and welfare of 
involved countries might occur if one of the members is larger or smaller than the other 
countries involved.  In the case of a larger member country, the expectation is that accession 
of another country would reduce the gain or increase the loss observed by the member.  In 
other words, the larger the member country is, the less there is to gain (or more to lose) from 
expansion of an existing customs union.  This result is caused by an increase in the 
importance of trade displacement’s effect on the member country. 
Isolating these effects requires examination of the movement of the z values as member 
countries and accession country eliminate tariffs between one another.  As discussed earlier, 
the direct effects (and indirect effects) of tariff changes on the crossover z values will result 
in changes in trade among all four countries.   Due to the large number of possibilities of 
customs union combinations and different effects of enlargement, a mathematical example 
will help show these effects.  A brief discussion of how the relative country sizes also affect 
the results will follow as well. 
IV. Numerical Simulation 
A numerical simulation of the model will clarify the different ramifications of 
potential enlargement of a customs union. Production technology is given by 
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(46) 
,-. = 1p ,-qr:. 
so that 
,-. represents a labor-output coefficient for each country i. Si can be interpreted as 
skill index for country i, and a country’s skill index increases with i, so that country 1 has the 
lowest skill index (1) and country 4 has the highest (4).  This production technology results 
in monotonically decreasing functions of z, +,-..  The fi, which represent a constant 
technology coefficient unique to a country, are set so that fi/fi+1 = 0.5.  Labor endowments are 
assumed to be equal, L1=L2=L3=L4, and expenditure is the same across commodities, θ(z) = z 
for all z, which implies identical preferences for goods across the continuum.19 
 With these parameters, many different simulations can be constructed to examine 
possible customs unions and enlargement.  First, the two country model is examined to give a 
basic sense of the model.  Next, the simulation of the three country model is presented, along 
with the various possible trade agreements.20 Finally, the simulation of the four country 
model is presented. With the four country model, there exist the autarky and free trade cases, 
the base tariff case, and six different two-country unions.  For each of these six possible 
unions, there are two enlargement possibilities.  For these simulations, of particular interest 
are the positions of the crossover goods, the wage ratios, and the welfare of each country.  To 
examine the potential effects of enlargement, initial tariff rates are set at rates of 30%.  In 
addition, by doing this, confirmation and comparison to ACF’s results are also possible. 
 There are many cases examined in separate simulations. First, in the two country 
setting, free trade and a base tariff case are examined for general introduction.  Next, the 
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 Several possible examples where labor endowments are not equal will also be examined. 
 
20
 ACF (1989) presents a simulation of three countries, and this simulation produces identical values for the 
same parameter settings. 
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three country model is also outlined in the free trade, base tariff, and the three possible 
customs unions.  Finally, the four country model is introduced with the free trade, base tariff, 
and the ten possible customs unions21. The results are summarized in tables 1.1-1.3. 
 For the two country model, presented in table 1, the tariffs create a section of non-
traded goods between z values of 0.37 and 0.63.  The elimination of both tariffs results in 
each country producing half of the goods, with C1 producing and exporting the “low-skill” 
half and C2 producing and exporting the “high-skill” half of the goods. 
 The results of the three country model simulations, which provide identical crossover 
z values as presented in Table 2 of ACF (1989), are presented here in table 2 along with 
wage ratios and nominal utility values. 
 The results of the four country simulations are presented in table 3.  As in the two and 
three country models, C1 exports the “low-skill” goods located near zero on the indexed 
continuum of goods. Increasing z values from zero sees C2 begin to compete with C1 for 
lower values of z, then with C3 for higher values of z. Continuing to move up (or right) along 
z spectrum, C3 becomes the exporter until it competes with C4, and then C4, with the highest 
skilled labor force, becomes the exporter of goods with z values located near 1. 
 The base tariff case is presented first in the table 3.  Each country has at least one 
section of the continuum that is non-traded goods.  C1 exports between 0 and 0.30 and 
imports goods ranging from 0.40 to 1, leaving the range from 0.30 to 0.40 as non-traded 
goods for the low-skill country.  C2’s non-traded goods range from 0.23 to 0.30 and 0.51 to 
0.66.  C3’s non-traded goods range from 0.39 to 0.51 and 0.72 to 0.93.  C4’s non-traded 
goods fall in the range from 0.55 to 0.72.  One result of different customs unions is the 
changing – increasing, decreasing, or moving – the range on non-traded goods. 
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 In the four country model, there are six possible two country unions and four possible three country unions. 
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Following the base tariff case are the simulations for the free trade and two-country 
union cases.  The changes in utilities are also presented in table 422.  There are several 
interesting observations.  First, C1 strongly prefers a union with C4 – nearly three times more 
than a union with C3 and about seven times more than a union with C2.  In every case for C1, 
a union with partner idrives down the value of Ωi, while driving the value of Ωj up for j≠i.  
However, similar to the results in the three-country model where C1 preferred C3 for much 
the same reason, C1’s choice of C4 only slightly pushes Ω4 down while Ω2 and Ω3 increase.  
As a result of C1 and C4’s union, C4 also no longer exports any goods to C3 as a result of the 
changes in the terms of trade.  The union of C1 and C4 eliminates both countries ranges of 
non-traded goods, as the range of exports and imports both increased.  From C1’s 
perspective, C4 has replaced C3 as the source for the lower end of the high-skill goods – those 
goods ranging from 0.59 to 0.72.  Welfare analysis shows that a union between C1 and C4 
results in both countries experiencing increases (although C1’s increase is far greater than 
C4’s).  However, C2 and C3 both experience a decrease in welfare as the terms of trade move 
against them. 
The results for single partners of C2 are similar to that of C1.  C2 prefers C4 as a 
partner over C3 and C1.  A C2-C4 union provides interesting results, and will continue to do 
so when enlargement of the union is examined.  Such an agreement eliminates exports (but 
not imports) from C3 to C2, as well as exports from C3 to C4.  With the partners ‘surrounding’ 
C3, there is no longer a range of goods for which it is cheaper for either C2 or C4 to import 
from C3 rather than either produce for itself or import from its partner.  Again, there is a 
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 Recall that these discussions of changing values of utility and welfare are isolated to those caused by the 
changes in trade patterns and relative wages. 
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welfare gain by both countries in the union while those outside the union experience a 
welfare decrease. 
The simulations show that C3 would prefer C4 as a partner, then C1 followed by C2.  
This could be considered a break from expectations, where the one might not consider C4 to 
be the most dissimilar union partner.  But the agreement with C4 increases the imports from 
cheaper producer – eliminating competition on the high-skill goods and non-traded goods, 
but allows C3 to produce goods all the way down to 0.41 to export to C4.  The union with C4 
allows C3 to move its specialization of production for export – both the upper and lower 
limits – down the continuum.   In the base tariff case, C3 exported goods ranging from 0.51 to 
0.72 (while producing from 0.39 to 0.93).  After forming a union with C4, C3 exports (and 
produces) goods with z values between 0.41 and 0.71.C4 also prefers C3 as a union partner 
over C2 and C1, respectively, although the potential increases in welfare aren’t that of the 
other countries potential gains.   
The results for the simulation of the four country model also include the four possible 
three country unions.  In each case, compared to the base tariff case, the country which is left 
out of the union experiences a welfare loss and an increase in the range of non-traded goods.  
Values of Ω also increase for the country that is excluded from the union. In the case of CU 
234, where C1 is left outside of the union, all three values of Ω2, Ω3, and Ω4 decrease, 
showing a decrease in the wage in C1 relative to that of the other countries. For each of the 
four countries, there are three possible three-country unions that it can be a part of.  In most 
cases, when compared to the base tariff case, a country prefers the union which includes the 
highest skilled countries possible.  For example, C1 prefers (in order) CU 134 over CU 124 
and CU 123.  C2 prefers CU 234 over CU 124 and CU 123.  C4 prefers CU 234 over CU 134 
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and CU 124.  However, C3 prefers CU 134 over CU 234 and CU 123.  This will be discussed 
further in the examination of enlargement possibilities. 
Central to this paper and the reason that four countries are needed in the model is the 
examination of potential enlargements of existing customs unions.  There are twelve different 
possible scenarios: there are six possible two country unions, and for each of those, there are 
two possible accession countries.  For example, CU 12 is one of the six possible unions of 
two countries, and enlargement of the union can happen with either C3 or C4 joining the 
union.  The more specific results, including import, exports, and wage ratios/terms of trade 
can be found in table 3.  Values of utility and percentage changes are summarized in table 5.   
For each of the possible union enlargements, the acceding country experiences a gain in 
welfare, while the country that remains outside of the union experiences a welfare decrease 
as it is left outside of the enlargement. 
Expansion of CU 12 to include C4 rather than C3 is preferred for both C1 and C2. For 
both members, the gain from C4 accessing is far greater than it would be if C3 were to join 
the union.  This does not come as a surprise, as we have seen that the low skill countries 
stand to gain significantly from forming a union with the high skilled country.  So it is a 
reasonable extension that a “low skilled union” would gain from adding a high skill country. 
Similarly, expansion of CU 13 and CU 23 to include C4 is preferred for both member 
countries.  In both cases, the lower skill country experiences a larger percentage change in 
welfare than C3 when C4 joins the union.  C3 would gain more than the lower skilled country 
if the other lower skilled country joined the union (C3 gains more than C2 if C1 joins CU 23, 
and C3 gains more than C1 if C2 joins CU 13), but the addition of C4 is preferred in either 
41 
 
situation.  The lower skilled country does still experience a welfare increase if the other 
lower skilled country joins the union in these two cases. 
The other three cases – enlargement of CU 14, CU 24, or CU 34 – offer different 
results.  First, examining the enlargement of a union between the two higher skilled 
countries, C3 and C4, shows that the current members may not prefer the same acceding 
country.  C3 experiences a larger gain from including C1 in the union rather than C2, while C4 
gains more from including C2 rather than C1.  C3 experiences a 1.56% increase in welfare 
with the addition of C1 to the union, but only a 0.82% increase if C2 accedes into the union.  
Conversely, C4 experiences a 0.87% increase if C2 joins the union, compared to a 0.61% 
increase if C1 joins.  In addition, there is a lot at stake for the two possible acceding 
countries.  If C1 joins the union, it experiences a 30.7% increase in welfare, while it 
experiences 3.13% decrease in welfare if C2 is the country that joins.  Likewise, C2 
experiences a 31.35% increase in welfare if it joins CU 34, while it experiences a 5.81% 
decrease if it remains outside the union while C1 joins. 
The differences in the effects of the enlargement of CU 34 are not surprising.  C4 
prefers the higher skilled of the two low-skill countries as a potential partner.  However, C3 is 
in competition with C2 as a source for exports, so C3 has more at stake with the addition of 
either C1 or C2 to CU34.  With the addition of C1 to CU 34, C3 is able to become a source of 
exports to C1 that it was previously importing from C2.   
Enlargement of CU 14 or CU 24 presents another key result of the simulation.  Unlike 
enlargement of CU 34, both current members do prefer one of the acceding countries over 
the other.  In these cases, C3 is preferred to the other low skilled country in both cases.  
However, the important result is that, in both enlargement of CU 14 or CU 24, the low skilled 
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country experiences a decrease in welfare if the other low skilled country is the acceding 
country.  This shows that it is possible for a current member to be worse off after 
enlargement of the customs union.  Looking at enlargement of CU 14, C1 experiences a 
1.37% decrease in welfare if C2 joins the union, versus a 2.52% increase if C3 accedes into 
the union.  As for the potential members, C2 experiences a 32.37% increase in welfare if it 
joins CU 14, and a 4.12% decrease if C3 joins instead.  Meanwhile, C3 experiences a 19.65% 
increase in welfare by joining CU 14, and a 0.24% decrease in welfare if it is left outside the 
union.  The increase in welfare for C2’s joining CU 14 represents the largest increase in 
welfare for any country as a result of forming or joining a customs union in the simulation.  
Enlargement of CU 24 presents similar results.  If C1 joins the union, C2 experiences a 0.70% 
decrease in welfare, versus a 0.30% increase in welfare if C3 were to join.  As did C2 in the 
previous case, C1 experiences a significant increase (24.9%) increase in welfare through 
joining CU 24. 
In both of these cases, where welfare potentially decreases as a result of enlargement, 
it is important to note that both countries had significant increases in welfare due to the 
original formation of the customs union. As previously seen in table, the greatest possible 
increase in welfare due to the formation of a (two country) customs union was C2’s 26.84% 
increase in welfare caused by the formation of CU 24.  Second to that is C1’s 24.21% 
increase in welfare as a result of the formation of CU 14.   So in both cases, the low skilled 
country has gained much by joining the original union.  After that, enlargement results in a 
relatively less increase if C3 is included, and a decrease if the other low skilled country joins. 
The simulation also demonstrates that the ‘location’ of the low-skilled country on the 
continuum of goods is important.  In the model and simulation, C1 benefits from having no 
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countries competing on the low end of the continuum.  In contrast, C2, the other low-skilled 
(but slightly more skilled than C1) country, must compete with C1 to provide the other 
counties with goods.  The more similar the two low skilled countries are, the more each 
would individually gain from union with one of the high skilled countries.  In addition, each 
would have more to lose with the inclusion of the other low-skilled country in that union.   
Expanding on the discussion of the simulation above, the closer C1 and C2 are in skill level, 
the more each would gain from being a member of CU 14 or CU 24, but the negative effects 
of either expanding to CU 124 would be greater. 
Trade Creation, Trade Diversion, and Trade Displacement 
Trade creation, diversion, and displacement effects are all produced in the numerical 
example.  Trade creation occurs when goods that had previously not been traded begin to be 
after trade is liberalized.  Trade diversion occurs when a member begins to import a range of 
goods from a new member country that it had previously imported from the non-member.  
Finally, trade displacement occurs when a range of goods that had been previously imported 
by a member from another member is then imported from the new member after accession. 
Examination of table 3 allows for the analysis of trade creation, trade diversion, and trade 
displacement brought on by the enlargement of a customs union.  The union possibilities in 
the three country model (table 2) could be used to examine trade creation and trade diversion, 
but not trade displacement simultaneously.  Table 3 lists the trade patterns, wage ratios, and 
nominal utility values for each of the two country (six possibilities) and three country (four 
possibilities) unions.   
Let us first examine the example of the enlargement of the customs union between 
countries 1 and 2 (CU 12).  Before looking at the two possibilities for enlargement, a few 
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notes about CU 12 should be made.  First, while C1 exports the same goods to all three other 
countries, C2 exports a much larger array of goods to C1 relative to its exports to C4 and C3.   
C2’s exports to C3 are very small, ranging only from 0.32 to 0.36 on the indexed continuum.  
Also of note is that C4’s non-traded goods, [.56,.72], is larger than the goods which C3 
exports to C1 and C2, [.61,.72]. 
Either C3 or C4 can be the accession country in this first example, forming CU 123 or 
CU 124.  In the former, C1 continues to produce the same array of goods for export to all 
three other countries, and thus has little to no effects of trade creation, diversion or 
displacement with regard to its exports.   However, the sources of C1’s imports do change.  
The array of C1’s imports from C3 grows in both directions, moving from [.61, .72] to [.53, 
.82], partially due to trade displacement, and partially due to trade diversion.  Trade 
displacement occurs as the new member’s exports (C3’s) displaces some of the other 
member’s exports (C2’s) to C1.   
Examining this effect in more detail shows a clear example of the trade displacement 
caused by the enlargement of a customs union.  Prior to enlargement, C2 was exporting the 
range [0.32, 0.61] to its union partner, C1, while C3 was exporting [0.61, 0.72] to C1.  After 
C3 joins CU 12, C1 imports goods from C3 that it had been importing from C2, namely, the 
range [0.53, 0.61].  This range of goods represents C2 exports which have been displaced by 
exports from the new member.23 
In terms of welfare, this is beneficial to C1, as its consumers pay a lower price for 
those imports.  For C2, this trade displacement has a negative welfare effect.  However, C2 
and C3 both benefit from trade creation between one another as C3 joins CU 12. C2’s exports 
                                                           
23
 Part of this effect may also be caused by shifts in the wage ratios, but this is a rather explicit example of trade 
displacement caused by the enlargement of CU 12 to CU 123. 
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to C3, which were small initially, grow significantly, as do C3’s exports to C2.  Finally, trade 
diversion is also occurring.  The addition of C3 to CU 12 causes C1 and C2 to import goods 
from C3 that it was previously importing from C4, even though C4 continues to be the lowest-
cost producer.  
With the above description of the effects of the enlargement, positive welfare effects 
are expected for C1, due to the reduction in prices its consumers face with no significant 
change in exports, and C3, due to trade creation with C2, displacement of exports to C1 from 
C2, and trade diverted to it from C4 – meaning that C3’s exports to the members have 
replaced exports from the non-member, C4.  A negative welfare effect for C4 is expected, as 
trade is diverted away from it – meaning that its exports to the members have been replaced 
by the new member. The expected result for C2’s welfare change depends on the magnitude 
of the effects.  The net welfare effect will result from the combination of the positive effect 
of trade creation with C3 and the negative effect of the trade displacement of its exports to C1.  
In the simulation, the net welfare effect is a positive increase of 5.71%. 
The net welfare effect on the world is positive, that is, the gains of C1, C2, and C3 are larger 
than the welfare loss experienced by C4.  The role of trade displacement plays an interesting 
one in this outcome.  As noted, displacement is expected to have a positive impact on world 
welfare, as production moves from a high-cost source to a low-cost source. What has 
essentially happened is that the trade displacement caused by the enlargement of a customs 
union has reversed some of the effects of trade diversion caused by the original formation of 
the union.  In our CU 123 example, the addition of C3 to CU 12 eliminates some of the trade 
diversion that occurred as C1 and C2 formed the union.   In the CU 12 example, C3 is the low 
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cost producer for goods ranging from 0.47 to 0.72.24 So the original formation of the union 
caused trade diversion on the upper end of C2’s exports to C1 (at the expense of C3’s exports), 
but the inclusion of C3 in the union reverses this effect. 
A similar analysis can be used to examine the effects of C4 acceding into CU 12 while 
C3 remains the non-member.  The results are very similar to those above, perhaps even more 
pronounced.  C1’s welfare increases, as C1’s exports remain largely unchanged, it continues 
to import a fairly large array of goods from C2, and imports a greater number of goods from 
C4.  C2 also experiences a large increase in welfare.  There is little trade displacement away 
from it as in the example above, while it is the recipient of trade diversion (it now exports 
goods that C3 can produce at a lower cost). Likewise, C4 exports more goods to C1 and C2, 
but no longer exports to C3 at all. Trade is diverted away from C3 on both ends of its region 
of production, and the negative welfare effect of this is illustrated. 
In the previous section, one of the most peculiar cases was the one that involved the 
enlargement of CU 24.  The initial formation of CU 24 eliminated exports from C3 to both C2 
and C4, while C3 imports from those two countries were reduced dramatically.  Conversely, 
C1 imported a larger array of goods from C3 than in the base tariff case. To consider the 
enlargement of CU 24, allow C2 and C4 to be the member countries, C1 the accession 
country, and C3 the non-member.  
After enlargement (to CU 124) C1, the accession country, expands its exports to both 
C2 and C4 from [0, .25] to [0, .32].  Thus, the enlargement to CU124 has caused trade 
creation between C1 and C2, as production moved from the higher cost C2 to the lower cost 
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 The wage ratios of CU 12 are used to determine the lowest-cost producer.  Note that these values will change 
as the wage ratios change, so the lowest-cost producer of a good may change from one scenario to another.  In 
the movement from CU 12 to CU 123, the goods for which C3 is the lowest-cost producer changes from [0.47, 
0.72] to [0.53, 0.63] using the given wage ratios.  This highlights the general equilibrium nature of the model – 
as wages change, the trade pattern changes. Yet, as the trade pattern changes, the wage ratios also must change.  
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C1.  However, the increase in trade between C1 and C4 is trade displacement (away from C2).  
Prior to enlargement, C2 was exporting the range [.25, .32] to C4 despite C1 being the lowest-
cost producer as a result of their membership to the CU 24.  After enlargement, this trade 
diversion caused by the initial formation of CU 24 is reversed.  The effects on C3 are 
significant as well.  Instead of exporting a wide array of goods to C1 only, after enlargement 
to CU 124, C3 exports a smaller array of goods to all three countries.  Trade has been 
diverted away from the non-member toward both of the members; that is, C2 and C4 both 
export some goods to C1 that C3 could produce at a lower cost. 
The summary of the enlargement from CU 24 to CU 124 is thus: trade creation 
between C1 and C2, trade diversion away from C3 as C2 and C4 export goods to C1 despite C3 
being the lowest cost producer, and trade displacement away from C2 (to C1) as C1 exports 
goods to C4 that C2 previously had.  The reason this is a peculiar case is because of the net 
welfare effects of this enlargement.  C1 has a large, positive gain in welfare, as would be 
expected with trade creation and ‘inward’ trade displacement, and it now imports more goods 
from C4 than C3.  C4 also ends up better off, as it receives more goods from the lowest cost 
producer than it previously had.  As anticipated, the welfare of C3 decreases through the 
enlargement process, as trade is diverted away from it (and on both ends of its regions of 
production).  The welfare effect of C2 is the unusual result.  C2 experiences trade creation 
with C1, trade diversion (at C3’s expense) and trade displacement away from its production, 
or outward trade displacement.  The net negative welfare effect suggests that the trade 
displacement effect dominates the trade creation and trade diversion effects.   
As noted in the previous section, the enlargement of CU 14 to CU 124 and the two 
possible enlargements of CU 34 are other interesting cases.  The former is very similar to the 
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case in the previous paragraph, where the accession of C2 into CU 14 causes significant trade 
displacement of C1’s exports to C4 (C2 being the new source of imports for C4).  This 
negative trade displacement effect on C1 dominates any positive trade creation and trade 
diversion effects, and C1 experiences a net welfare loss while C2 (accession country) and C4 
(member country) experience a net gain.  C3, the non-member, again experiences a net 
welfare loss. 
While both members experience a net welfare gain through the enlargement of C 
U34, trade displacement has a significant effect on the magnitude of that gain.  The inclusion 
of C2 in CU 34 would be preferred by C4, while C1 would be preferred by C3.  If C2 is the 
accession country, then trade displacement occurs at the expense of C3 in that C2 now exports 
goods to C4 that C3 previously had.  While not a concern to C4, some of this trade 
displacement is eliminated if C1 were the accession country rather than C2. 
The relative sizes of the countries involved in the enlargement of a customs union is also 
expected to have an impact on the magnitude of the trade displacement effects caused by 
enlargement.  The impact of differences in labor endowments is important because the 
enlargement effects are different, as the initial – prior to any customs union and enlargement 
– trade pattern is altered.  A larger country, relative to the example where all countries are of 
equal sizes, has a lower relative wage and produces a larger section of the continuum of 
goods. For example, in the base tariff case of the simulation, if C1 is 1.5 times larger than the 
other countries, it will produce and export the goods from [0,0.27] to C2 and [0,0.35] to C3 
and C4 instead of [0,0.21] and [0,0.30], respectively.   
Results from similar simulations as above, yet allowing for changes in the labor 
endowment of countries 1 and 2, are presented in tables 6a-d and 7.  Simulations are 
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undertaken with both larger and smaller endowments for countries 1 and 2, and the growth of 
CU 14 and CU 24 to CU 124 is examined.  While the growth of CU 14 to include C2 results 
in some ambiguity in the role of country size of both the accession and the member country, 
the enlargement of CU 24 to CU 124 results in the expected changes.  With C1 being the 
accession country, the larger its labor endowment, the less negative (actually positive) the 
effect on C2 of enlargement.  This would suggest that the larger C1, the less the importance of 
trade displacement relative to that of trade creation.  Trade displacement certainly still 
occurs, as C1 replaces C2 as the source for some of C4’s goods as in the original simulation, 
yet the overall welfare implications are different. 
In addition to possible differences in the accession country’s labor endowment, the 
size of the member country would also have an effect on the effects of enlargement.  As seen 
in the enlargement of CU 24 with C1 acceding, the larger C2’s labor endowment results in a 
more negative result of enlargement.  In the original simulation where labor endowments 
were equal across all countries, the enlargement of CU 24 to CU 124 caused a decrease in 
C2’s welfare of 0.7%.  If C2 were 1.5 times the size of the other countries, the decrease in per 
capita welfare rises to 1.61%.  This would suggest that the larger the member country, the 
greater the relative importance of trade displacement effects. 
The changes in the effects of enlargement depend on the size of the countries 
involved, and the result comes down to the potential income that each country stands to gain 
or lose directly through its exports and indirectly through its relative wages.  In the case of a 
customs union of CU 24, the larger C2 is, the wider the array of the continuum that it 
produces prior to enlargement (see Table 6c), and the larger country size causes its exports to 
C4 to ‘encroach’ on the exports of either C1 or C3 to C4 even more than CU 24 does in the 
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case where labor endowments are equal25.  Then, following enlargement to CU 124, the 
decrease in C2’s exports to C4 (and C1’s increase) has a greater negative impact on the 
welfare of C2. 
V. Policy Implications and Conclusions  
The expansion of the Ricardian trade model to four countries has allowed the 
investigation into the results of expansion of trade agreement areas.  In some cases, 
expansion of a customs union resulted in an increase in the welfare of all included countries, 
and the best potential accession country was the same for both current members.  However, 
in other cases, as the numerical simulation shows, the current members differ on which 
potential accession country would benefit the home nation the most.  In addition and perhaps 
most influential is the possibility of a member country experiencing a decrease in welfare as 
a result of expansion of the customs union.  For low-skilled countries, the inclusion of 
another low-skilled country had negative effects on welfare. 
These results have interesting policy implications.  First, the model suggests that 
initial formation of a customs union is beneficial to those involved.  However, after the initial 
formation, it may be in one’s best interest to prevent others from joining the union.  
Additionally, the model suggests that it is never beneficial to be left out of the union as it 
welcomes other countries.  In a sense, for some countries, the best policy would be pro-
enlargement, but only if they are accession candidates.  If they are not a candidate for 
accession, it’s better if no other country is either.  If the country does happen to be a 
candidate for accession, it might be in its best interest to prevent others from being a 
                                                           
25
 As seen in the table 3 and 6a-c, in this simulation, CU 24 eliminates exports from C3 to C4.  However, when 
C2 is sufficiently smaller, as presented in table 6d, then C1 and C3 both export to C4 when CU 24 exists. 
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potential candidate.  And if the country does enter the union, it may be better off keeping all 
others out of the union, but it also may be better off letting in additional countries. 
The model has allowed insight into the process of enlargement through trade patterns 
and welfare analysis.  While the model itself is general enough to account for all possible 
variations, the numerical simulation is unique due to the fixed parameters.  Variations in the 
labor endowments resulted in some ambiguity, but other cases did provide the expected 
results.   While no major variations are expected as a result of small changes in these 
parameters, future work will need to verify this.  Along the same lines, the results could 
potentially change depending on the development levels of the countries involved.  
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Table 1.1 – Two country simulation 
Two Country Case        
Base tariff case        
  Country 1 Country 2 Ω2 0.967 U1 0.596 
Country 1 exports to:   [0, .37]   U2 0.684 
Country 2 exports to:  [.63, 1]      
Free trade case        
  Country 1 Country 2 Ω2 1 U1 0.708 
Country 1 exports to:   [0, .5]   U2 0.708 
Country 2 exports to:  [.5, 1]      
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Table 1.2 – Three country simulation 
Three Country Case        
Base tariff case        
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Ω2 1.39 U1 0.911 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .28] [0, .36] Ω3 1.07 U2 0.700 
Country 2 exports to: [.47, .65]  [.36, .50]   U3 1.036 
Country 3 exports to: [.65, 1] [.84, 1]      
Autarky case        
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Ω2  U1 0.500 
Country 1 exports to:    Ω3  U2 0.667 
Country 2 exports to:      U3 1.000 
Country 3 exports to:        
Free trade case        
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Ω2 1.35 U1 1.129 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .37] [0, .37] Ω3 1.05 U2 0.837 
Country 2 exports to: [.37, .65]  [.37, .65]   U3 1.080 
Country 3 exports to: [.65, 1] [.65, 1]      
1-2 Customs Union        
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Ω2 1.32 U1 0.985 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .38] [0, .38] Ω3 1.12 U2 0.744 
Country 2 exports to: [.38, .77]  [.38, .45]   U3 1.031 
Country 3 exports to: [.77, 1] [.77, 1]      
1-3 Customs Union        
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Ω2 1.51 U1 1.131 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .25] [0, .43] Ω3 1.07 U2 0.679 
Country 2 exports to: [.43, .54]  [.43, .54]   U3 1.058 
Country 3 exports to: [.54, 1] [.92, 1]      
2-3 Customs Union        
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Ω2 1.32 U1 0.873 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .29] [0, .29] Ω3 1.02 U2 0.830 
Country 2 exports to: [.49, .64]  [.29, .64]   U3 1.068 
Country 3 exports to: [.64, 1] [.64, 1]      
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Table 1.3 – Four country simulation 
Four Country Case         
Base tariff case 
        
 
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.64 U1 1.500 
Country 1 exports to: 
 
[0, .23] [0, .30] [0, .30] Ω3 1.61 U2 0.934 
Country 2 exports to: [.40, .51] 
 
[.30, .39] [.30, .51] Ω4 1.12 U3 1.024 
Country 3 exports to: [.51, .72] [.66, .72] 
 
[.51, .55] 
  
U4 1.656 
Country 4 exports to: [.72, 1] [.72, 1] [.93, 1] 
     
Free trade case 
        
 
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.59 U1 1.881 
Country 1 exports to: 
 
[0, .31] [0, .31] [0, .31] Ω3 1.56 U2 1.181 
Country 2 exports to: [.31, .51] 
 
[.31, .51] [.31, .51] Ω4 1.09 U3 1.207 
Country 3 exports to: [.51, .71] [.51, .71] 
 
[.51, .71] 
  
U4 1.721 
Country 4 exports to: [.71, 1] [.71, 1] [.71, 1] 
     
1-2 Customs Union 
        
 
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.56 U1 1.552 
Country 1 exports to: 
 
[0, .32] [0, .32] [0, .32] Ω3 1.65 U2 0.994 
Country 2 exports to: [.32, .61] 
 
[.32, .36] [.32, .47] Ω4 1.14 U3 1.021 
Country 3 exports to: [.61, .72] [.61, .72] 
 
[.47, .56] 
  
U4 1.651 
Country 4 exports to: [.72, 1] [.72, 1] [.94, 1] 
     
1-3 Customs Union 
        
 
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.74 U1 1.621 
Country 1 exports to: 
 
[0, .22] [0, .37] [0, .29] Ω3 1.50 U2 0.913 
Country 2 exports to: [.37, .44] 
 
[.37, .44] [.29, .54] Ω4 1.16 U3 1.078 
Country 3 exports to: [.44, .84] 
     
U4 1.657 
Country 4 exports to: [.84, 1] [.65, 1] [.84, 1] 
     
1-4 Customs Union 
        
 
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.75 U1 1.863 
Country 1 exports to: 
 
[0, .22] [0, .29] [0, .37] Ω3 1.72 U2 0.888 
Country 2 exports to: [.37, .51] 
 
[.29, .39] [.37, .51] Ω4 1.11 U3 1.014 
Country 3 exports to: [.51, .59] [.66, .77] 
 
[.51, .59] 
  
U4 1.677 
Country 4 exports to: [.59, 1] [.77, 1] 
      
2-3 Customs Union 
        
 
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.59 U1 1.496 
Country 1 exports to: 
 
[0, .24] [0, .24] [0, .32] Ω3 1.54 U2 1.024 
Country 2 exports to: [.41, .52] 
 
[.24, .52] [.32, .52] Ω4 1.13 U3 1.055 
Country 3 exports to: [.52, .68] [.52, .89] 
 
[.52, .52] 
  
U4 1.652 
Country 4 exports to: [.68, 1] [.89, 1] [.89, 1] 
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2-4 Customs Union 
        
 
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.56 U1 1.471 
Country 1 exports to: 
 
[0, .25] [0, .32] [0, .25] Ω3 1.61 U2 1.184 
Country 2 exports to: [.42, .48] 
 
[.32, .37] [.25, .60] Ω4 1.09 U3 1.018 
Country 3 exports to: [.48, .74] 
     
U4 1.688 
Country 4 exports to: [.74, 1] [.60, 1] [.96, 1] 
     
3-4 Customs Union 
        
 
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.66 U1 1.461 
Country 1 exports to: 
 
[0, .23] [0, .30] [0, .30] Ω3 1.55 U2 0.904 
Country 2 exports to: [.39, .54] 
 
[.30, .41] [.30, .41] Ω4 1.09 U3 1.195 
Country 3 exports to: [.54, .71] [.70, .71] 
 
[.41, .71] 
  
U4 1.697 
Country 4 exports to: [.71, 1] [.71, 1] [.71, 1] 
     
1-2-3 Customs Union 
        
 
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.57 U1 1.653 
Country 1 exports to: 
 
[0, .32] [0, .32] [0, .32] Ω3 1.49 U2 1.051 
Country 2 exports to: [.32, .53] 
 
[.32, .53] [.32, .50] Ω4 1.19 U3 1.106 
Country 3 exports to: [.53, .82] [.53, .82] 
    
U4 1.646 
Country 4 exports to: [.82, 1] [.82, 1] [.82, 1] 
     
1-2-4 Customs Union 
        
 
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.56 U1 1.837 
Country 1 exports to: 
 
[0, .32] [0, .32] [0, .32] Ω3 1.79 U2 1.176 
Country 2 exports to: [.32, .57] 
 
[.32, .34] [.32, .57] Ω4 1.08 U3 1.012 
Country 3 exports to: [.57, .64] [.57, .64] 
 
[.57, .64] 
  
U4 1.702 
Country 4 exports to: [.64, 1] [.64, 1] 
      
1-3-4 Customs Union 
        
 
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.85 U1 1.910 
Country 1 exports to: 
 
[0, .21] [0, .35] [0, .35] Ω3 1.57 U2 0.852 
Country 2 exports to: [.35, .45] 
 
[.35, .45] [.35, .45] Ω4 1.12 U3 1.213 
Country 3 exports to: [.45, .70] 
  
[.45, .70] 
  
U4 1.707 
Country 4 exports to: [.70, 1] [.73, 1] [.70, 1] 
     
2-3-4 Customs Union 
        
 
Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.52 U1 1.416 
Country 1 exports to: 
 
[0, .25] [0, .25] [0, .25] Ω3 1.50 U2 1.188 
Country 2 exports to: [.43, .51] 
 
[.25, .51] [.25, .51] Ω4 1.06 U3 1.204 
Country 3 exports to: [.51, .71] [.51, .71] 
 
[.51, .71] 
  
U4 1.711 
Country 4 exports to: [.71, 1] [.71, 1] [.71, 1] 
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Table 1.4 - Four Country Model; Two Country Unions 
 
 
 Base Tariff CU 12 CU 13 CU 14 
U1 1.500 1.552 1.621 1.863 
  3.47% 8.09% 24.21% 
     
 Base Tariff CU 12 CU 23 CU 24 
U2 0.934 0.994 1.024 1.184 
  6.46% 9.62% 26.84% 
     
 Base Tariff CU 13 CU 23 CU 34 
U3 1.024 1.078 1.055 1.195 
  5.31% 3.00% 16.67% 
     
 Base Tariff CU 14 CU 24 CU 34 
U4 1.656 1.677 1.688 1.697 
  1.27% 1.93% 2.45% 
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Table 1.5 - Four Country Model; Union Enlargement Possibilities 
 
    
 CU 12 CU 123 CU 124  CU 13 CU 123  CU 134  CU 14 CU 124 CU 134 
U1 1.552 1.653 1.837 U1 1.621 1.653 1.910 U1 1.863 1.837 1.910 
  6.50% 18.39%   1.95% 17.81%   -1.37% 2.52% 
            
U2 0.994 1.051 1.176 U2 0.913 1.051 0.852 U2 0.888 1.176 0.852 
  5.71% 18.30%   15.11% -6.69%   32.37% -4.12% 
            
U3 1.021 1.106 1.012 U3 1.078 1.106 1.213 U3 1.014 1.012 1.213 
  8.33% -0.89%   2.54% 12.51%   -0.24% 19.65% 
            
U4 1.651 1.646 1.702 U4 1.657 1.646 1.707 U4 1.677 1.702 1.707 
  -0.35% 3.08%   -0.67% 3.03%   1.50% 1.78% 
            
            
 CU23 CU 123 CU 234  CU 24 CU 124 CU 234  CU 34 CU 134 CU 234 
U1 1.496 1.653 1.416 U1 1.471 1.837 1.416 U1 1.461 1.910 1.416 
  10.44% -5.41%   24.90% -3.77%   30.70% -3.13% 
            
U2 1.024 1.051 1.188 U2 1.184 1.176 1.188 U2 0.904 0.852 1.188 
  2.66% 16.05%   -0.70% 0.30%   -5.81% 31.35% 
            
U3 1.055 1.106 1.204 U3 1.018 1.012 1.204 U3 1.195 1.213 1.204 
  4.85% 14.21%   -0.62% 18.32%   1.56% 0.82% 
            
U4 1.652 1.646 1.711 U4 1.688 1.702 1.711 U4 1.697 1.707 1.711 
  -0.37% 3.61%   0.85% 1.39%   0.61% 0.87% 
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Table 1.6a – Four country case, different endowments 
 
Four Country Case Country 1's Labor endowment is 1.5 x that of the other countries 
         
Base tariff case         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.44 U1 0.830 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .27] [0, .35] [0, .35] Ω3 1.34 U2 0.884 
Country 2 exports to: [.45, .54]  [.35, .41] [.35, .54] Ω4 0.91 U3 1.026 
Country 3 exports to: [.54, .73] [.70, .73]  [.54, .56]   U4 1.671 
Country 4 exports to: [.73, 1] [.73, 1] [.95, 1]      
         
Free trade case         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.38 U1 1.028 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .36] [0, .36] [0, .36] Ω3 1.28 U2 1.118 
Country 2 exports to: [.36, .54]  [.36, .54] [.36, .54] Ω4 0.88 U3 1.202 
Country 3 exports to: [.54, .73] [.54, .73]  [.54, .73]   U4 1.746 
Country 4 exports to: [.73, 1] [.73, 1] [.73, 1]      
         
1-4 Customs Union         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.54 U1 1.010 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .25] [0, .33] [0, .42] Ω3 1.43 U2 0.834 
Country 2 exports to: [.42, .54]  [.33, .41] [.42, .54] Ω4 0.89 U3 1.019 
Country 3 exports to: [.54, .62] [.70, .81]  [.54, .62]   U4 1.704 
Country 4 exports to: [.62, 1] [.81, 1]       
         
2-4 Customs Union         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.38 U1 0.815 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .28] [0, .36] [0, .28] Ω3 1.32 U2 1.111 
Country 2 exports to: [.47, .52]  [.36, .40] [.28, .62] Ω4 0.89 U3 1.024 
Country 3 exports to: [.52, .74]      U4 1.709 
Country 4 exports to: [.74, 1] [.62, 1] [.96, 1]      
         
1-2-4 Customs Union         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.35 U1 1.001 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .37] [0, .36] [0, .37] Ω3 1.49 U2 1.114 
Country 2 exports to: [.37, .59]   [.37, .59] Ω4 0.87 U3 1.017 
Country 3 exports to: [.59, .66] [.59, .66]  [.59, .66]   U4 1.729 
Country 4 exports to: [.66, 1] [.66, 1]       
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Table 1.6b - Four country case, different endowments 
 
Four Country Case Country 1's Labor endowment is 2/3 x that of the other countries 
         
Base tariff case         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.88 U1 2.730 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .20] [0, .27] [0, .27] Ω3 1.95 U2 0.985 
Country 2 exports to: [.34, .48]  [.27, .37] [.27, .48] Ω4 1.38 U3 1.024 
Country 3 exports to: [.48, .71] [.63, .71]  [.48, .54]   U4 1.645 
Country 4 exports to: [.71, 1] [.71, 1] [.92, 1]      
         
Free trade case         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.85 U1 3.459 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .27] [0, .27] [0, .27] Ω3 1.90 U2 1.244 
Country 2 exports to: [.27, .49]  [.27, .49] [.27, .49] Ω4 1.35 U3 1.215 
Country 3 exports to: [.49, .70] [.49, .70]  [.49, .70]   U4 1.703 
Country 4 exports to: [.70, 1] [.70, 1] [.70, 1]      
         
1-4 Customs Union         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 2.01 U1 3.438 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .19] [0, .25] [0, .32] Ω3 2.07 U2 0.942 
Country 2 exports to: [.32, .48]  [.25, .37] [.32, .48] Ω4 1.38 U3 1.011 
Country 3 exports to: [.48, .58] [.63, .75]  [.48, .58]   U4 1.659 
Country 4 exports to: [.58, 1] [.75, 1] [.98, 1]      
         
2-4 Customs Union         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.78 U1 2.676 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .22] [0, .28] [0, .22] Ω3 1.98 U2 1.258 
Country 2 exports to: [.36, .45]  [.28, .35] [.22, .58] Ω4 1.34 U3 1.013 
Country 3 exports to: [.45, .74]      U4 1.672 
Country 4 exports to: [.74, 1] [.58, 1] [.96, 1]      
         
1-2-4 Customs Union         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.82 U1 3.391 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .28] [0, .28] [0, .28] Ω3 2.17 U2 1.244 
Country 2 exports to: [.28, .54]  [.28, .32] [.28, .54] Ω4 1.34 U3 1.008 
Country 3 exports to: [.54, .62] [.54, .62]  [.54, .62]   U4 1.683 
Country 4 exports to: [.62, 1] [.62, 1]       
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Table 1.6c - Four country case, different endowments 
 
Four Country Case Country 2's Labor endowment is 1.5 x that of the other countries 
         
Base tariff case         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.74 U1 1.493 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .22] [0, .29] [0, .29] Ω3 1.63 U2 0.590 
Country 2 exports to: [.37, .53]  [.29, .41] [.29, .53] Ω4 1.11 U3 1.019 
Country 3 exports to: [.53, .74] [.69, .74]  [.53, .57]   U4 1.664 
Country 4 exports to: [.74, 1] [.74, 1] [.96, 1]      
         
Free trade case         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.72 U1 1.876 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .29] [0, .29] [0, .29] Ω3 1.57 U2 0.728 
Country 2 exports to: [.29, .55]  [.29, .55] [.29, .55] Ω4 1.08 U3 1.191 
Country 3 exports to: [.55, .73] [.55, .73]  [.55, .73]   U4 1.739 
Country 4 exports to: [.73, 1] [.73, 1] [.73, 1]      
         
1-4 Customs Union         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.84 U1 1.844 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .21] [0, .27] [0, .35] Ω3 1.74 U2 0.564 
Country 2 exports to: [.35, .53]  [.27, .41] [.35, .53] Ω4 1.09 U3 1.015 
Country 3 exports to: [.53, .61] [.69, .79]  [.53, .61]   U4 1.685 
Country 4 exports to: [.61, 1] [.79, 1] [1, 1]      
         
2-4 Customs Union         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.66 U1 1.454 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .23] [0, .30] [0, .23] Ω3 1.62 U2 0.732 
Country 2 exports to: [.39, .51]  [.30, .39] [.23, .62] Ω4 1.07 U3 1.015 
Country 3 exports to: [.51, .76]      U4 1.707 
Country 4 exports to: [.76, 1] [.62, 1]       
         
1-2-4 Customs Union         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.69 U1 1.824 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .30] [0, .30] [0, .30] Ω3 1.83 U2 0.720 
Country 2 exports to: [.30, .60]  [.30, .35] [.30, .60] Ω4 1.06 U3 1.011 
Country 3 exports to: [.60, .67] [.60, .67]  [.60, .67]   U4 1.723 
Country 4 exports to: [.67, 1] [.67, 1]       
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Table 1.6d - Four country case, different endowments 
 
Four Country Case Country 2's Labor endowment is 2/3 x that of the other countries 
         
Base tariff case         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.57 U1 1.512 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .25] [0, .32] [0, .32] Ω3 1.60 U2 1.470 
Country 2 exports to: [.42, .49]  [.32, .38] [.32, .49] Ω4 1.14 U3 1.029 
Country 3 exports to: [.49, .70] [.64, .70]  [.49, .54]   U4 1.651 
Country 4 exports to: [.70, 1] [.70, 1] [.91, 1]      
         
Free trade case         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.50 U1 1.894 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .33] [0, .33] [0, .33] Ω3 1.55 U2 1.899 
Country 2 exports to: [.33, .48]  [.33, .48] [.33, .48] Ω4 1.11 U3 1.223 
Country 3 exports to: [.48, .70] [.48, .70]  [.48, .70]   U4 1.709 
Country 4 exports to: [.70, 1] [.70, 1] [.70, 1]      
         
1-4 Customs Union         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.67 U1 1.881 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .23] [0, .30] [0, .39] Ω3 1.71 U2 1.390 
Country 2 exports to: [.39, .49]  [.30, .38] [.39, .49] Ω4 1.13 U3 1.014 
Country 3 exports to: [.49, .58] [.64, .76]  [.49, .58]   U4 1.672 
Country 4 exports to: [.58, 1] [.76, 1] [.99, 1]      
         
2-4 Customs Union         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.48 U1 1.494 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .26] [0, .34] [0, .26] Ω3 1.61 U2 1.902 
Country 2 exports to: [.44, .46]  [.34, .35] [.26, .57] Ω4 1.12 U3 1.023 
Country 3 exports to: [.46, .72] [.57, .57]  [.57, .57]   U4 1.675 
Country 4 exports to: [.72, 1] [.57, 1] [.93, 1]      
         
1-2-4 Customs Union         
 Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4 Ω2 1.46 U1 1.857 
Country 1 exports to:  [0, .34] [0, .33] [0, .34] Ω3 1.76 U2 1.913 
Country 2 exports to: [.34, .54]   [.34, .54] Ω4 1.10 U3 1.012 
Country 3 exports to: [.54, .62] [.54, .62]  [.54, .62]   U4 1.687 
Country 4 exports to: [.62, 1] [.62, 1]       
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Table 1.7 – Union enlargements, different endowments 
 
Various Country Size Cases        
 C1 is Larger         
 Base CU  
14 
CU  
124 
% 
change 
  Base CU  
24 
CU 
124 
% 
change 
U1 0.830 1.010 1.001 -0.90%  U1 0.830 0.815 1.001 22.77% 
U2 0.884 0.834 1.114 33.59%  U2 0.884 1.111 1.114 0.33% 
U3 1.026 1.019 1.017 -0.26%  U3 1.026 1.024 1.017 -0.75% 
U4 1.671 1.704 1.729 1.46%  U4 1.671 1.709 1.729 1.17% 
           
 C1 is Smaller       
 Base CU  
14 
CU 
124 
% 
change 
  Base CU 
24 
CU 
124 
% 
change 
U1 2.730 3.438 3.391 -1.36%  U1 2.730 2.676 3.391 26.75% 
U2 0.985 0.942 1.244 32.10%  U2 0.985 1.258 1.244 -1.04% 
U3 1.024 1.011 1.008 -0.33%  U3 1.024 1.013 1.008 -0.46% 
U4 1.645 1.659 1.683 1.40%  U4 1.645 1.672 1.683 0.61% 
           
 C2 is Larger        
 Base CU  
14 
CU  
124 
% 
change 
  Base CU 
24 
CU 
124 
% 
change 
U1 1.493 1.844 1.824 -1.07%  U1 1.493 1.454 1.824 25.49% 
U2 0.590 0.564 0.720 27.77%  U2 0.590 0.732 0.720 -1.61% 
U3 1.019 1.015 1.011 -0.33%  U3 1.019 1.015 1.011 -0.38% 
U4 1.664 1.685 1.723 2.27%  U4 1.664 1.707 1.723 0.97% 
           
 C2 is Smaller       
 Base CU  
14 
CU  
124 
% 
change 
  Base CU 
24 
CU 
124 
% 
change 
U1 1.512 1.881 1.857 -1.29%  U1 1.512 1.494 1.857 24.30% 
U2 1.470 1.390 1.913 37.61%  U2 1.470 1.902 1.913 0.58% 
U3 1.029 1.014 1.012 -0.18%  U3 1.029 1.023 1.012 -1.07% 
U4 1.651 1.672 1.687 0.93%  U4 1.651 1.675 1.687 0.77% 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Trade Displacement: Empirical Evidence from a Shift-Share Analysis of the EU 
I. Introduction 
Economic integration and trade agreements are prevalent in the world today. The role 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement is an important issue in trade policy in the 
United States.  The European Union has grown both in terms of depth of integration and in 
members, and recently, the EU has begun to explore the possibility of trade agreements with 
countries in the Mediterranean region.  Specific countries in Asia also belong to a regional 
free trade agreement, as do countries in South America and Africa as well. 
While a significant portion of the literature in the field addresses the effects of 
integration on the countries involved, literature addressing the growth of such trade 
agreements is scarcer.   While the previous essay examined the theoretical effects of the 
enlargement of a customs union in the Ricardian Model, this essay will focus on the 
empirical effects, and more precisely, examine evidence of trade creation, trade diversion, 
and trade displacement through the enlargement of the European Union.  A shift-share, or 
constant market share, analysis is used to isolate and investigate the magnitudes of the three 
separate, yet related, trade effects expected to occur as a customs union expands in size. 
The purpose of applying the shift-share method on the European countries is to 
examine the competitive residual trade effects that each group or individual country has 
experienced after stripping away market and commodity effects.  By eliminating market and 
commodity effects – that is, effects on exports caused by changes in the markets that the 
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goods are destined for or changes in the demands for certain commodities – a clearer picture 
of systematic changes in export patterns is visible.  It is these changes in exports that are of 
interest.  Trade creation, trade diversion, and more specifically, trade displacement effects 
can be inferred by looking at the patterns of changes among the various groups or individual 
countries.  Trade displacement effects would be demonstrated by new member countries’ 
exports increasing congruently with a reduction in exports from current members.  As data 
will be intentionally limited to exports that are destined for EU markets, systematic increases 
in exports from the new members to the EU members combined with reduction of exports 
from one member to another implies that the sources of international trade is shifting toward 
the new members. 
The application of the shift-share method to EU trade allows for a better examination 
of the trade displacement effects caused by enlargement.  However, as opposed to the 
discussion in the previous essay, the shift-share results only allow scrutiny of export patterns 
and not a glimpse into overall welfare.  Hence, although increased exports may imply 
benefits and reduction in exports may imply some losses, net welfare effects are not 
evaluated.  The purpose of this paper is to try to isolate changes in export patterns to establish 
the presence of trade displacement.  As implied in the previous essay, trade displacement 
would involve positive and negative welfare effects for the countries involved, but there are 
many other aspects of EU membership that would affect net welfare.  Therefore, only these 
trade effects are examined. 
As mentioned, investigating the trade displacement effects caused by the enlargement 
of the EU is the goal of this paper, yet the expected timing of the effects is not easy to 
identify.  Included in the sample period will be the enlargement of the EU in 1995 to include 
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Austria, Finland, and Sweden; the 2004 enlargement that added eight Central and Eastern 
European countries, Malta, and Cyprus; and the 2007 enlargement that included Romania 
and Bulgaria.  However, the trade effects of enlargement on the new and old members are 
likely to be felt before the actual accession dates.  In fact, the 2004 and 2007 accession 
countries had all signed Europe Agreements well before accession which provided for the 
liberalization of trade with the EU in most products.26 For example, Slovakia signed its 
Europe Agreement in 1993, it went into effect in 1995, and elimination of tariffs on trade 
with the EU was to occur by the beginning of 2001, followed by the elimination of 
quantitative restrictions by 2002.  Thus, the reduction of trade barriers which causes the trade 
effects of interest, has occurred over a longer period and was not at a one-time occurrence at 
accession. For this reason, and because of limited availability of post-enlargement data, the 
discussion of the changing patterns of trade will in general focus on the entire sample, rather 
than emphasize pre- and post-accession. 
The paper is presented as follows: Section 2 presents the methodology used in the analysis, 
and the following section discusses the data used.  The fourth section presents results of the 
analysis with data categorized into country groups, while the fifth looks at the results when 
the countries are kept separate.  A sixth section examines the potential policy implications of 
the study. The final section concludes. 
II. Methodology 
The shift-share analysis, which is also often called a constant market share analysis, 
has been used for many years and in other areas as well.27  Besides using the approach as a 
                                                           
26
 The Europe Agreements came into effect in 1994 for Hungary and Poland, in 1995 for Romania, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, in 1998 for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and in 1999 for Slovenia. 
 
27
 See Dinc and Haynes (2005) for discussion on uses of the shift-share method in other areas. 
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way to analyze export growth, the shift share analysis is also a useful tool to examine growth 
effects in employment, often at the regional level, as in Markussen, Noponen, and 
Driessen(1991) or Esteban (2000).  The method can also be used to analyze one particular 
country’s competitiveness relative to a set of reference economies, and may also be limited to 
a particular commodity.  Chern et al. (2002) is a good example of this, as the authors 
examine Singapore’s export performance of electronics and chemicals relative to other 
Southeast Asian countries using a dynamic approach.  The use of year-to-year data is not 
very common, and the traditional constant market share analysis, like that of Leamer and 
Stern (1970), only involves two points in time. 
This study of EU trade attempts to blend the background and terminology of Leamer 
and Stern while including dynamic effects.  The spirit of the study is also similar to Chaptea, 
Gaulier, and Zignago (2005), who use the constant market share approach to look at export 
performance among 88 countries, including members of the EU.  The authors note that the 
dependence of the members on the internal EU market will have an effect on the 
competitiveness of their exports in the world market.   
To examine the growth in exports of the 27 EU countries, a dynamic shift-share analysis is 
employed.  An important assumption made in this analysis is that each country’s share of 
intra-EU trade should remain constant; that is, each country’s exports should grow at the 
same rate as other EU members.  However, this is seldom true, and this analysis allows the 
above or below average growth to be broken down into a market effect, a commodity 
composition effect, and a residual or competitiveness effect. 
The following definitions are needed to derive the equations for the shift-share 
analysis: 
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= Total trade from country c to partner j in period t 
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= Total intra-EU trade of commodity i from country c in period t 
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= Total intra-EU trade of country c in period t 
Armed with the above definitions and the constant market share assumption, we can 
begin to disentangle the different effects through the following identities. Initially, treating 
exports as one common good, we have 
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On the left hand side, we have actual growth of EU exports from country (or group) c, and on 
the right, the first term represents growth at the EU average, and the term in parentheses is 
the residual above or below that average growth.  
 Now, considering that exports are a variety of types of goods, we can write the above 
expression for one particular commodity i: 
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Aggregating this over all commodities results in 
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Again, the left hand side represents the actual growth in the value of exports, but we now 
have three terms on the right hand side.  The first term again represents growth at the EU 
average, the second term is a commodity composition effect, and the third term is again a 
residual beyond the first two effects.  The commodity composition effect is of important 
note, and can take on a positive or negative value.  The sign of this term depends on the 
makeup of the EU exports.  If EU exports of commodity i have grown faster than EU exports 
as a whole, then )( 1,1, ++ − tttti rr  will be positive.  After being weighted by ,.iV , if country c is 
exporting a greater proportion of products for which exports are growing faster than the 
overall average, then country c will exhibit a positive commodity composition effect.  If the 
commodity composition effect is negative, then country c is exporting a large share of 
commodities whose exports are growing at a slower than average rate. 
So far, the destination of exports from country c has been any one of the EU countries or the 
ROW.  We can again split this up into any of the 27 possible partners or destination markets 
for country c’s trade.  So for one particular commodity exported to one trading partner, we 
have 
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Aggregating over both commodities and trading partners results in 
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This equation is used for most shift-share analysis, and is also used to discover nominal 
values for the various effects.  We again have actual growth in exports on one side of the 
equation, but now there are four terms on the right hand side.  The first term again represents 
growth in exports at the EU average.  The second is the commodity composition effect as 
described above.  The third term is a market effect, and the fourth is again the residual.  Like 
the commodity effect, the market effect can take on a positive or negative value.  The term 
will be positive if a majority of country c’s exports are being sent to partners whose imports 
are growing at a faster rate than the EU average.  The market effect is negative for those 
countries that export a large share of their products to partners that are experiencing slower 
than average growth in imports. 
The residual, which is typically called the competitiveness effect, is an important part 
of the shift-share analysis.  A positive value for the competitiveness effect means that 
country c’s exports have grown faster than if it was to have maintained its market share.  
This, essentially, is the crux of the analysis.  We would like to explore if and how many of 
the EU countries have been able to maintain market shares as the Union has grown to include 
many new members. 
This analysis of EU trade will make two changes to this standard shift-share analysis.  First, 
the entire identity is divided by the value of trade in the initial year or time period t.  As a 
result, we have  
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Now, each of the terms represents a percentage growth in the value of trade.  The first term is 
the actual increase in the value of exports to the EU countries from country c.  The second 
change will be to move the average growth term to the left hand side to get 
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Now, the left hand side gives exactly what we are attempting to decipher: growth beyond or 
below what would be expected at the EU average.  The right hand side remains the 
commodity composition effect, the market effect, and the competitiveness effect, 
respectively, but each is now reported in terms of contribution to growth in values of exports. 
As an example, suppose country c experienced a 10% increase of exports between 
2000 and 2001, and that average growth for EU exports was 5%.  The goal of this analysis is 
to disentangle why country c’s exports grew 5% faster than the rest of the EU.  
Hypothetically, let the commodity composition effect be 4%, and the market effect is -2%.  
This would mean that country c is exporting a large share of commodities that EU countries 
are importing at higher rates than the average for all commodities.  On the other hand, 
country c is exporting a majority of its goods to partners whose imports are growing at a rate 
slower than the average, and this accounts for a 2% decrease in country c’s exports. The 
positive competitiveness effect means that country c was able to improve its position among 
its partners, resulting in a 3% increase in its exports. 
Another important feature of this analysis is that it includes a dynamic aspect.  Many 
shift-share analyses only compare market shares in an initial year and a final year.  This 
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analysis examines changes during a year-to-year span.  The drawback of doing this is that the 
results will likely be more muted, that is, very prolific changes over a one year period are not 
expected.  However, a dynamic analysis allows us to examine just how the countries’ exports 
have fared leading up to enlargement of the EU, rather than simple before and after snapshots 
of the process. With the goal of examining changes in the exports of these countries leading 
up to and through the enlargement process, the benefits of the dynamic analysis will 
outweigh the drawbacks. 
III. Data 
The data used for this analysis comes from the United Nations COMTRADE 
database.  Exports are classified into commodity groups among the 1-digit Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) rev. 3 categories, which are presented in Table 2.1.   
Table 2.1 SITC Commodity descriptions 
SITC 1st digit Description 
0 Food and live animals chiefly for food 
1 Beverages and tobacco 
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 
5 Chemicals and related products, nes 
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by materials 
7 Machinery and transport equipment 
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
9 Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC 
 
The variable used to evaluate trade is the total value of exports, reported in terms of US 
dollars.  As EU trade is the area of interest in this analysis, the reporters and trading partners 
are the members of the EU, as well as aggregated data for the rest of the world (ROW).  
Those countries that recently became members are included in the entire duration of the 
analysis.  For any given year, with 28 possible reporters (EU-27 and ROW), 27 possible 
partners, and 10 possible commodities, there are more than 7,500 possible data points.  
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Unfortunately, data on all 27 countries is not available for the entire analysis.  The 
availability of the data for the sample is presented in Table 2.2. This is one of the driving 
reasons for beginning the analysis in 1994, when 26 countries have data available.     
Several additional notes on the data are needed.  First, the ROW is treated as a single 
‘country’ outside of the European Union.  Therefore, no intra-ROW trade is included in the 
analysis.  For example, U.S.-China bilateral trade is not included in any way.  However, any 
particular European country’s trade with either the U.S. or China is included.  Secondly, it 
should be noted that Belgium and Luxembourg were treated as one reported by the UN 
database until 1999, when separate statistics were kept for each country.  The data for those 
countries were aggregated beyond 1999, and are listed as Belgium-Luxembourg. 
Table 2.2 Data Availability 
Country Initial Year Final Year 
Austria 1988 2007 
Belgium 1999 2007 
Belgium-Lux 1988 1998 
Cyprus 1989 2007 
Czech Rep 1993 2007 
Denmark 1988 2007 
Estonia 1995 2007 
Finland 1988 2007 
France 1988 2007 
Germany 1991 2007 
Greece 1988 2007 
Hungary 1992 2007 
Ireland 1988 2007 
Italy 1988 2007 
Latvia 1994 2007 
Lithuania 1992 2007 
Luxembourg 1999 2007 
Malta 1990 2007 
Netherlands 1988 2007 
Poland 1992 2007 
Portugal 1988 2007 
Slovakia 1994 2007 
Slovenia 1992 2007 
Spain 1988 2007 
Sweden 1988 2007 
United Kingdom 1988 2007 
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The use of data at the SITC 1-digit level has both benefits and drawbacks.  
Richardson (1971) points this out as well: “Commodity classifications should be as 
homogenous as possible, but there may be substantial costs to the collection and processing 
of highly disaggregated data.”  The 1-digit level allows for a more manageable data set than 
more disaggregated data.  Secondly, as long as the data can be broken down into both 
commodity and destination, it is possible to peel away the average, commodity, and market 
effects from the variable of interest, the competitiveness effects.  More disaggregated data, 
however, would allow a more precise analysis of the exports of the commodities that are 
growing at faster or slower rates than average.  The effect of the level of disaggregation on 
the overall accuracy of the commodity, market, and competitiveness effects has been 
debated, with Richardson (1971) suggesting that disaggregation causes fairly substantial 
changes in the estimations, while Fuchs and Lichtenburg found that changing classifications 
had little effect on accuracy.  Because of the large number of exporters and destination 
markets, as well as the focus on the changing nature of the competitiveness effects (and not 
just the values themselves), the SITC 1-digit is employed.  Richardson also found that the 
level of market disaggregation had little effect on the estimates for the competitiveness 
effects, which is important in the following section. 
IV. Analysis by Country Groups 
A shift share analysis, as described above, was performed on the 27 European 
countries with the trade data aggregated into country groupings.  The groups were 
determined in the following ways: The first group includes large members (LMC) of the EU, 
more specifically those that are included in the top of nominal GDP rankings.  The LMC 
group includes France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and Netherlands. The 
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next group is all other members (OMC) who were members of the EU previous to the 2005 
enlargement – Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, Austria, Finland, 
and Greece.  The new members (NMC) group includes those new members from 2005 and 
on – the Czech Republic, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, 
Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Estonia.  The rest-of-world group is treated as a single 
group, with intra-ROW trade eliminated.  In a similar fashion, the data for the trade from one 
member of a group to another member of the same group is also excluded.  For example, 
trade between Germany and France is not included, but trade between Germany and Poland 
is included in the analysis. 
The analysis with the data aggregated into these country groups is performed for 
several reasons, but also comes with a few drawbacks.  The potential benefits and drawbacks 
of this aspect of the analysis depend on whether the effects of enlargement show up in the 
bilateral trade between countries in the same group or in different groups.  The country group 
analysis will be effective in showing the role of trade displacement if the majority of the 
displacement occurs between countries in the LMC and the OMC groups.  If the enlargement 
of the EU caused reduced exports between one member in LMC and another member in 
OMC, then the following analysis by country groups will show these effects.  In fact, with 
the intra-group trade eliminated, only this trade displacement between groups will be 
presented in the analysis, and the magnitudes of these effects could therefore be overstated.  
However, as magnitudes of the effects are of less importance to the analysis than the 
existence of these effects, this overestimation is tolerable.  The country group analysis will 
help offer insight into the hypothesis that the enlargement of the EU causes trade 
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displacement away from the current members, i.e. the new members become the sources for 
exports for a country at the expense of the other members outside of its country group. 
The most important drawback of performing the analysis by country group arises if 
the majority of trade displacement caused by enlargement occurs between countries in the 
same groups.  If countries in either the LMC or OMC groups replace trade with other 
members of the same group with exports from the NMC, then these effects will not show up 
in the analysis.  For this reason, the analysis is performed by individual countries after the 
analysis by country groups. 
 
Figure 2.1 - Nominal Total Trade 
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Figure 2.2 - Share of Total Trade by Country Groups 
 
 
The share of exports of each country group is displayed in Figure 2.2. A glance at the 
figure reveals some fairly clear trends.  The large member countries (LMC) began the sample 
in 1994 with approximately 45% of the total $1.48 trillion of exports into (or out of to ROW) 
of the European Union.  The group finished the sample in 2007 with approximately 40% of 
the value of exports (of the $5.13 trillion).  The share of the other member countries’ (OMC) 
exports had more periods of increases, although the trade share decreased every year after 
2002, and overall declined from just below 22% to 19.4%.  On the other hand, the new 
member countries exhibited an increase in share of trade in every year in the sample except 
in 1999, although the value only decreased slightly.  Overall, the share of exports from that 
group increased from 3.34% in 1994 to 8.83% in 2007.  Exports from the rest of the world 
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(ROW) to the other three groups accounted for 29.6% of the trade in 1994, meaning that 
almost 30% of the non-EU countries’ trade was destined for Europe.  The value generally 
increased to a peak of 33.2% in 2000 before falling and then increasing again to 33.2% in 
2007. 
A very cursory analysis of these figures would suggest that the exports of the new 
members, and the ROW to a lesser extent, are increasing at a faster rate than that of the large 
members or other members.  This would suggest that trade displacement could be a 
significant factor in European trade over the past fifteen years.  However, the data must be 
further examined before any conclusions can be made. 
Rather than looking at the share of European trade the various country groups account 
for, the group’s growth in trade is another value that can provide insight into the presence of 
trade creation, diversion, and displacement.  These values are displayed in Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3 – Percentage growth in trade 
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the other European country groups in every year, and nearly every year compared to the 
ROW.   
A breakdown of the individual effects, particularly the competitiveness effect, will 
help illustrate the presence of the various trade effects.  These effects can be presented in 
nominal values, proportion of European trade, or trade growth percents.  The latter is perhaps 
the best at illustrating the difference in the competitiveness effects, which, as described 
above, is a measure of the unexplained growth in exports after accounting for normal growth, 
market destination, and commodity composition. 
Figure 2.4 – Competitiveness Effect 
 
 
The competitiveness effects exhibited in Figure 2.4 display the extremely large differences in 
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although small in magnitude (the largest change is 2000’s -2.0% growth). For the large 
member countries, the average over the entire sample is -.75%.  The countries in the other 
member countries grouping also have several years with negative values for the 
competitiveness effect.   In several years, the magnitude of the growth, in terms of percentage 
change, is greater than that of the large member countries, and it also shows fairly significant 
negative values from 2003 until the end of the sample.  The competitiveness effects for the  
ROW oscillates from positive to negative values with magnitudes similar to that of the other 
member countries.  The new member countries, in all but 1999, show large positive values 
for the competiveness effect, suggesting that exports from those countries increased 
significantly after accounting for normal growth, destination markets, and composition of 
exports.  Over the entire sample, the new member countries averaged an annual growth rate 
of 8.9%, meaning the exports from the new members have more than tripled due to the 
competitiveness effect. 
Table 2.3 - Percentage growths from 1993-5 average to 2004-6 average 
Group 
Total  
Growth 
Average 
Growth 
Commodity 
Effect 
Market  
Effect 
Competitiveness 
Effect 
L MC 159.2% 218.4% -5.65% -29.62% -23.95% 
N MC 532.3% 178.9% -4.26% -2.17% 359.84% 
O MC 163.09% 199.80% 11.95% -1.84% -22.92% 
ROW 220.79% 179.66% 11.47% 20.42% 9.24% 
 
Table 2.3 shows the results from a static analysis using the endpoints of the sample.  
These results from the static approach demonstrate how significant the competitiveness effect 
is for the new member countries when compared to the other effects of the other groups.  The 
commodity effects are relatively small for all four groups, but the positive values for the 
OMC and ROW groups suggest that exports from those countries have exported more goods 
for which demand is growing at a faster rate than average.  The market effect for the large 
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member countries is nearly -30%, meaning that those countries have experienced 30% fewer 
exports as a result of their destination markets growing at slower rates than average. This 
might also suggest that the large member countries have been slow to take advantage of the 
faster growing markets of Europe.  However, another explanation of this negative effect is 
that the LMC group trades with the ROW more than the other two groups, with the ROW 
growing at a slower rate than the OMC or NMC countries.  The ROW experienced an 
opposite effect, a 20% increase, suggesting that the ROW has taken advantage of the faster 
growing markets in Europe.   
Throughout the discussion above, the analysis has been centered on the percentage 
growth in trade of exports.  It should be noted, however, that a 10% increase in exports from 
the large member countries would not be equivalent to a 10% increase in exports from the 
new member countries, as the bases for growth are vastly different.   The nominal growth in 
exports from the four groups is shown in Figure 2.5. 
Figure 2.5 – Nominal Growth in Exports 
 
One can see that the nominal values of the growth in trade are greater for the LMC, 
OMC, and ROW groups than the NMC group.  However, much of this growth can be 
accounted for in the average or normal growth, the commodity effect, and the market effect.   
As shown in Figure 2.6, once those are stripped away and only the competitiveness effects 
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remain, the nominal growth (or reduction) in trade from the various groups are similar in 
magnitude, though in a markedly different in direction.   
Figure 2.6 – Nominal Values of Competitiveness Effect 
 
 Recalling the intention of the shift-share analysis performed on the exports of 
countries of the EU while separated into country groups is to attempt to establish the 
existence of the three trade effects, the results appear to shed some light.  While trade 
creation is usually assumed to exist with the reduction in trade barriers, trade diversion and, 
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members and the current members might imply a positive welfare effect, though there are 
more factors that enter into the net welfare effects overall.  Likewise, decreased trade (as a 
result of trade displacement) from some members might imply a negative welfare effect, 
though there might yet still be an overall positive effect of welcoming the new members 
caused by effects not included in this analysis.28 
V. Analysis by Individual Countries 
A shift-share analysis of the exports from the individual countries is also performed, 
and is necessary to try to alleviate the potential drawbacks of aggregation discussed earlier.  
Trade displacement that occurs with the enlargement of the EU that is between countries 
from the same group would not have become evident in the previous analysis.  By examining 
the individual countries, reductions in exports from members – regardless of whether they are 
destined for similar members or other – that coincide with increases in exports from the new 
members will be evident in the following analysis. 
The analysis will begin with the examination of the share of European exports to one 
another and the ROW attributed to the various individual countries, which are presented in 
the following graphs (please note the scale of the graphs are different).  The graphs are split 
into groups of five depending on the share of European exports.  The members of the EU-15 
are presented in the first three charts along with the ROW.   
As evidenced by the first chart, the ROW has increased its share of all exports 
destined for the EU from slightly above 20% to just below 25%.  Germany, which is easily 
the largest individual exporter in Europe, experienced a decline in trade share before 
recovering to nearly the same level by the end of the sample with a value of over 19%.  The  
                                                           
28
 For example, see Motta and Norman (2006) or MacDermott (2006) for discussion of investment flows and 
regional integration. 
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Figure 2.7 - Share of EU Exports 
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other three countries in the first chart experience a loss in the share of exports: France’s share 
drops from 11.1% to 7.95%, Italy’s share falls from 8.99% to 7.30%, and the UK’s share 
drops from 8.57% to 6.49%. 
The next set of countries is presented in the second set of graphs of Figure 2.7.  
Belgium-Luxembourg, Spain and Ireland each show a general increase early in the sample 
before a period of falling market share in the final years of the sample.  The Netherlands 
experienced the opposite trend – a falling share of exports followed by an increasing share.  
All four countries ended the sample with a slightly higher share of exports than in 1995.  
Sweden, much like France, Italy, and the UK, experienced a decrease in market share for 
much of the sample, falling from 3.02% to 2.48%.   
The smallest members of the EU 15, in terms of European export share, are present in 
the next set of graphs.  Austria experiences a trend similar to that of Belgium-Luxembourg, 
Spain and Ireland, as its export share increases early in the sample before falling near the 
end, but finishing the sample with a slight increase overall.  The smallest four members of 
the EU 15, Denmark, Portugal, Finland, and Greece, face falling shares of exports nearly 
throughout the sample.  Greece, however, does show some increases in export share in the 
latter years of the sample. 
The largest five countries of the new members are presented in the next set of graphs.  
The trend for these countries is a rather clear increase in share of European exports 
throughout the sample.  More specifically, several show slow growth, and perhaps a slightly 
falling trade share, in the early years of the sample followed by several years of relatively 
large increases.  Overall, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia all more than 
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doubled their shares of European exports through the sample, and Romania fell just short of 
that. Poland’s share grew from 0.877% to 2.02%, the Czech Republic share increased from 
0.848% to 1.78%, Hungary’s increased from .477% to 1.30%, Slovakia’s share grew from 
0.328% to 0.853%, and Romania’s share increased from 0.306% to 0.594%. 
Table 2.4 divides all of the countries in the sample into categories depending on the 
trend in their share of European exports.  Further analysis will follow, but these initial 
groupings are determined with merely a look at the graphs presented above. 
Table 2.4 – Trends in share of European exports 
Trend Countries 
Decreasing France, Italy, UK, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, Cyprus, Malta 
Decreasing, then increasing Germany, Netherlands, Greece, Slovenia, Bulgaria 
Increasing, then decreasing Belgium-Luxembourg, Spain, Ireland, Austria 
Increasing Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
 
Analysis of the trade shares allows for a glimpse into the trends in trade throughout the 
sample.  However, examination of the nominal values and the percentage growth values will 
help get further into the existence and significance of the various trade effects, namely the 
trade creation, trade diversion, and trade displacement.  In addition, examination of the 
competitiveness or unexplained growth effects will pare away average growth, market, and 
composition effects so that these factors do not influence the export growth throughout the 
sample. 
The following set of graphs in Figure 2.8 shows the competitiveness effects in terms 
of growth percents for the countries in the sample: 
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Figure 2.8 - Competiveness Effects, by growth rate 
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As expected, the competitiveness effects are much more erratic than the trends in the 
trade shares.  For the most part, however, the values of the competitiveness effects mirror 
those trends presented above.  Increases in trade shares appear to be correlated with positive 
values for competitiveness effects.  For example, as displayed in the last set of graphs, the 
largest of the new members of the EU each show positive competitiveness values for most of 
the sample, with a magnitude averaging about 8% per year.  Hence, after accounting for 
average growth, the makeup of its exports, and the destination for its exports, each of the five 
countries shown exhibited an average of 6%-9% growth over the entire sample.  Considering 
that an average of approximately 7.177% growth would double the initial value over a ten 
year period, it is clear that the new members have made significant increases in their 
European exports.   
Conversely, of the largest members, as shown in the first set of graphs, France, Italy, 
and the UK each show several years of the sample with a negative competitiveness effect in 
terms of growth percents.  Hence, these countries are losing their market share because they 
are actually exporting less than previous years to the rest of Europe after accounting for 
average growth.  Germany on the other hand, after a few years of falling exports due to the 
competitiveness effects, recovers with positive values for six of the final seven years of the 
sample.  The ROW, starting in 1996, shows positive values for five years, followed by 
negative values for three years, and then positive values again for the final four years of the 
sample.  
The ten other members of the EU 15 shown in the second and third sets of graphs all 
show much more volatile competitiveness effects over the sample period.  Of note in the first 
set, however, are Ireland’s positive values in the early part of the sample, followed by 
88 
 
negative values in the latter years.  In fact, of the five countries, Ireland, Belgium-
Luxembourg, and Sweden all have negative competitiveness effects in at least four of the last 
five years in the sample, and Spain has negative values in three of the years since 2003.   The 
Netherlands, conversely, shows positive competitiveness effects in four of the last five years 
of the sample. 
The smallest of the EU 15 members, shown in the third set of graphs, appear to show 
very little or no trend in competitiveness effects over the sample.  Once again, though, 
Austria, Denmark, and Finland all show negative values in four of the years since 2003.  
Greece and Portugal only exhibit negative competitiveness effects in two of those years.  
However, in Portugal’s case, those negative competiveness effect values in 2004 and 2005 
imply an approximate 8% decrease in exports in each of those years, compared to 0.346% 
and 0.0359% increases in exports in 2006 and 2007, respectively. 
The positive and negative competitiveness effects, as reported in terms of percentage 
growths, are difficult to compare.  For example, Poland showed the largest average increase 
in trade over the sample at 8.44% per year while the UK exhibited an average of 2.75% 
decrease in exports per year due to the competitiveness effect.  These values allow for insight 
due to the sign of the value, but because the countries’ values of trade vary so much at the 
beginning of the sample, the nominal values must also be examined. 
The main goal of examining the nominal values of the competitiveness effect is to 
infer whether the gains in trade values from one or more countries comes as a loss in trade 
values in other countries.  Among the large members shown in the first set of graphs, the 
competitiveness effects of France’s exports are profound.  Over the sample, after accounting 
for average growth of exports and the growth due to composition and destination markets,  
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Figure 2.9 - Average Annual Competitiveness Effect, by growth rate 
 
 
France averaged a reduction in trade by nearly $9 B per year, equivalent to almost $115 B 
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through 2007, France averaged a loss of $14.6 B per year and a total of more than $73 B.  
Italy and the United Kingdom experience similar effects.  For Italy, the competitiveness 
effect averages -$3.53 B per year for a total of -$45.9 B.  The United Kingdom experiences a 
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Figure 2.10 – Nominal values of competitiveness effects 
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2007, when Italy exhibited a positive competitiveness effect of $14 B while the UK 
experienced its largest loss – an astounding $71 B reduction of exports due to the 
competitiveness effect. 
As above, the mid-size and smaller members presented in the second and third sets of 
graphs exhibit competitiveness effects that show several years of positive and negative 
values.  Belgium-Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden, and Ireland each have periods of growth 
before finishing the sample with at least three years of negative growth among the last five, 
including 2006 when Belgium-Luxembourg and Ireland lost more than $10B worth of trade.  
There are similar trends in the smaller country group, though the magnitude of the trade 
growth and losses is smaller (note the difference in the scale).  The new members in the chart 
show growth in the value of trade in most years in the sample, and those positive values 
appear to be increasing in magnitude.  Compared to France’s loss of $14.6 B worth of trade 
per year over 2003 to 2007, Poland averaged increases of $7.7 B, the Czech Republic 
averaged increases of $5.5 B, and Slovakia averaged increases of $3.8 B.  In 2007 alone, in 
the final year of the sample after accounting for average, market, and composition effects, 
these three nations combined for an increase in $28 B worth of trade – $11.0 B for the Czech 
Republic, $8.6 B for Poland, and $8.4 B for Slovakia. 
Discussion of the implications that these trade effects have on country welfare is not a 
goal of this paper, though it is somewhat difficult to ignore.  It does seem, however, that the 
positive values of the competitiveness effects for the new members would have a positive 
welfare effect on the country as a whole.  This would be just one factor in the net welfare 
change in the countries due to EU enlargement.  Conversely, it might seem as though the 
negative values, as for France, for example, would imply a negative welfare effect.  While 
92 
 
the unexplained decrease in exports might have a negative effect, there are many other 
avenues in which EU enlargement has an effect on overall welfare of the country.  Hence, 
while the trade effects may be negative, it is impossible to make general statements about the 
overall welfare effects of enlargement. 
While the changes in patterns of the exports of the European countries have been 
demonstrated in the graphs above, the implication for the reasons for these changes has 
remained that the run-up and accession to the EU has been largely responsible.  However, it 
is important to note that individual countries have experienced different situations, and 
various policy effects may be driving some of the changes in export performance.  One such 
example is Germany, which showed signs of decreased export performance early in the 
sample followed by a recovery of market share and positive competitiveness effects later in 
the sample.  Prior to the sample used, the reunification of East and West Germany had major 
implications on the German economy.  Michael Burda and Jennifer Hunt (2001) provide a 
fairly exhaustive demonstration of the changes in the labor markets – wages, productivity, 
and migration – in post-unification Germany, as does Snower and Merkl (2006) and Burda 
(2006).  Hans-Werner Sinn (1996) addressed the devaluation of other currencies as a result of 
German unification.  All of these ‘unification shocks’ are surely felt well into the sample and 
could contribute to the changes in German export patterns. As Sinn (2000) indicates, 
however, much of the adjustments, particularly the wage and productivity gaps between West 
and East, seemed to have become fairly stable by the mid-1990’s, creating the question of the 
implications of post-unification adjustments on German exports around the turn of the 
century. 
93 
 
Germany is certainly not the only country to undergo changes prior to the run-up to 
enlargement.  In fact, many of the 2004 accession countries experienced various socio-
economic transformations over the past decades, and determining the effects of these 
structural changes apart from preparation for integration is a difficult task.  In an examination 
of the effects of integration on Slovakia, Vagac et al. (2001) concede this point: “It is 
extremely difficult or impossible to separate the effects of EU integration from other 
components of the process [of transformation] . . . It is also difficult to differentiate between 
the gains and losses arising from the various stages of relations with the EU.”29 
As a result of these various individual country circumstances that might affect trade 
patterns, caution in making sweeping interpretations of the results of the shift-share analysis 
need to be taken.  But caution with interpretations is also not unique to this analysis, and one 
could also argue, particularly in the case of the new members (but not in the case of 
Germany), that the transition in the economies was in large part due to the prospect of 
accession into the EU, and therefore part of the larger integration process.  While the shift-
share analysis above has focused on the liberalization of trade between the EU countries and 
new members, we can conclude that this liberalization over the sample period is one 
(significant) part of the enlargement process. 
VI. Policy Implications 
The shift-share analysis performed above shows that, in terms of the value of trade, 
the new members of the EU have increased exports in recent years at a rate much greater 
than the average of EU countries.  On the other hand, both the groups of the large member 
countries and the other members before the unprecedented enlargement in 2004, have 
increased exports at a rate below that of the average.  In addition, the increases in exports 
                                                           
29Vagac et al. (2001), page 21. 
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from the new members are increasing through the sample.    While negative growth from the 
competitiveness effect – or positive growth below average – is fairly consistent for the large 
members as a group, the other members of the EU show significant negative competitiveness 
effects in the latter portion of the sample. 
As individual countries, the results are consistent with the group results.  However, 
France and the U.K., and Italy to some extent, have carried the losses of the large countries, 
while Germany has maintained its position as the dominant exporter of the EU.  Additionally, 
most of the other members of the EU outside of the largest countries have also shown 
decreases in exports after accounting for average growths.  Combined with the increases in 
exports from the new members at well above average rates, these results suggest that the new 
members’ exports are an increasing source of competition for EU members’ exports. 
The policy implications of these results are that the enlargement of the customs union 
may not be a welcome thing to all current members of the EU.  While this analysis is 
admittedly only examining the trade aspect of enlargement, the results show that the exports 
from new members of the EU have essentially crowded out the exports of many of the 
current members.  This, however, is not universal, as evidenced by the performance of 
Germany in the sample.  The implication of this is that, while it benefits a nation a great deal 
to be a member of the EU in terms of export performance, it is also beneficial to many to not 
allow other nations to become part of the union.  This is the case for many members, 
including some of the largest and most influential members such as France and the U.K., but 
also smaller members such as Ireland and Portugal.   Overall, on the basis of trade 
performance, the results of this analysis suggest pro-enlargement policies for those outside of 
the union, but anti-enlargement policies for many members once they become part of the 
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union.  For example, while many of the eastern European countries have worked diligently 
and campaigned for EU enlargement over the past decade so they could be included, this 
analysis suggests that, since they are now members, they should change to an anti-
enlargement stance when presented with possible future enlargements. 
VII. Conclusions 
One of the main goals of this analysis is to establish the existence of the three different trade 
effects discussed earlier in the paper – trade creation, trade diversion, and trade displacement.  
The three effects and their expected results are presented in Table 2.5 below. 
Table 2.5 – Expected results of trade effects 
Effect Expected result 
Trade Creation Increased exports from new to current members; increased exports from current to 
new members 
Trade Diversion Increased exports from new to current members; decreased exports from ROW to 
current members 
Trade 
Displacement 
Increased exports from new to current members; decreased exports from some 
current to other current members 
 
The results of the shift-share analysis, which attempts to strip away the effects due to 
average growth of trade and changes in trade due to market and composition effects, show 
that the effects of trade displacement are potentially large.  Increased exports from the new 
members to the current members – both large and other members – is demonstrated by the 
results of the data.  However, this is expected in each of the three trade effects.  Increased 
trade from the new members to other members most likely resulted from trade creation.  The 
lack of the expected increase in exports at even average growth rates from the current 
members to the new members actually suggests that the magnitude of trade displacement 
may be understated, given that some trade creation did occur.  In fact, access to the new 
member markets, and thus where trade creation would be most significant, is a key to 
Germany’s ability to recover and maintain its share of exports.  The share of Germany’s 
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European exports destined to the new members rose from about 8% to about 13% over the 
sample,  while only Italy’s share of European exports topped 6% of all the other nations 
(other than the new members themselves). 
The discussion of trade diversion is one that is inconclusive, mainly because the 
results for the ROW are rather erratic.  There is a period from 2001-2003 where there is a 
decrease in the export value originating in the ROW destined for the EU, which suggests that 
trade diversion may have been taking place during that time.  While many of the new 
members do show positive values for the competitiveness effect during this time, several 
others do as well.  The competitiveness values for France, while still negative, are much less 
than in the subsequent years, and Belgium-Luxembourg, Spain, Austria, and Portugal all 
seem to benefit from this reduction in exports from the ROW.  As these countries were 
already current members, these results do not provide evidence of trade diversion.  One 
possible explanation is the adjustment to the common currency during that time period.  The 
increased trade from the ROW to the EU in the latter part of the sample can also not be 
explained by the trade effects.  
While Germany’s value of exports was able to recover in the latter portion of the 
sample, many other member countries exhibited decreases in export values in many years 
when taking the competitiveness effect into account.  These decreases suggest that a 
significant amount of trade displacement occurred.  The increases in exports from the new 
members have come at the expense of exports originating from other current members, both 
large and small, and old and more recent members.  In these cases, as opposed to the German 
example, the added exports to the new members have not made up for the lost exports to 
other members.  These ‘lost’ exports are due to the increased competition from the new 
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members.  Countries, such as Germany, are replacing some imports from other members 
such as France with imports originating from Poland, the Czech Republic, or Slovakia.  The 
negative values for the competitiveness effects show that the increased access to the new 
members’ markets has not made up for the losses due to added competition in other export 
markets.  Thus, for some nations, the negative effects of trade displacement caused by 
enlarging the EU have appeared to outweigh any positive effects of trade creation. 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Investigation of Trade Displacement Caused by the Enlargement of the EU 
I. Introduction 
Participation in preferential trade agreements is a common form of economic policy in 
today’s global environment.  The European Union is the largest customs union, both in terms 
of size, population, and volume and value of traded goods.  There has been a fairly 
significant amount of literature dedicated to the effects of the formation of such a customs 
union, but little has been said about the effects of enlargement of an existing customs union.   
This paper will estimate the significance of those effects in terms of the trade displacement 
effects caused by the enlargement of the EU. 
Since Jacob Viner first used the terms ‘trade creation’ and ‘trade diversion’ in 195030, 
they have become staples of trade agreement literature.  Viner’s trade creation was based on 
increases in welfare caused by the shifting of production from a high-cost producer to a low-
cost producer as a result in changing trade policy, namely the reduction of trade barriers.  
Trade diversion involved production of goods relocating from a low-cost producer to a high-
cost producer, a result that could have negative welfare implications.  The importance and 
magnitude of these effects have been discussed in regard to the formation of a customs union 
(or preferential trade agreement). 
When a customs union expands to include new members, as the EU has done on 
multiple occasions, these two effects continue to exist.  However, there also exists the 
                                                           
30
 Viner, Jacob. The Customs Union Issue. 
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potential for a third effect: trade displacement.  Using Viner’s terms, trade displacement 
results in a production shift from a high-cost producer to a low-cost producer, yet not in the 
same manner as trade creation.  Trade displacement involves the movement of production 
from one member of the customs union to a lower-cost new member.  As production costs 
decrease, an overall increase in welfare is expected.  However, individual country welfare 
depends on the trade displacement.  Essentially, trade displacement occurs when an existing 
member’s exports are displaced by exports from a new member. 
Trade displacement is, in fact, a matter of import switching, which is where this essay 
differs from the previous two.  While those essays examined export performance amidst an 
enlarging customs union, this essay will use import data to identify the significance of trade 
displacement within an enlarging EU.  In terms of trade displacement, import switching 
refers to substituting imports from one country (a higher cost existing member) with lower 
cost imports from another (a new member).  An example of this within the EU would be 
Germany substituting imports from France with imports from Poland. 
The existence and magnitude of this result is exactly what this essay will examine – 
the trade displacement effects of EU enlargement.  Import data will be used to investigate the 
role of trade displacement from the largest imports in the EU with a focus on the effects on 
both the new member countries and the existing member countries. The next section of the 
paper briefly discusses the use of the gravity equation in international trade literature. Section 
3 of the paper describes the data that will be used.  Sections 4 through 6 discuss the model 
used to estimate trade values, along with the significance and magnitude of the trade 
displacement effects.  Section 7 concludes. 
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II. Literature Review 
The gravity model in international trade was first introduced by Tinbergen (1962) and 
Poyhonen (1963), and its continued use is a testament to the explanatory power it provides.  
While its uses within the field of international trade span a variety of topics, it has been 
particularly useful in estimating the effects of integration, policy effects, and membership in 
a supernational organization on trade flows.  Rose (2004) is a leading example of this last 
type by measuring the effect of WTO membership on trade.  Despite its clear usefulness, part 
of the initial criticism of the gravity model stems from the perceived lack of theoretical 
foundations of the model in international trade.  This topic has been addressed by several 
notable well respected authors such as Jeffrey Frankel, James Anderson, Jeffrey Bergstrand, 
Alan Deardorff, Eric Van Wincoop, Elhanan Helpman, and Paul Krugman.  These, authors, 
along with many others, have provided an evolution of theoretical foundations of the gravity 
model.  Anderson (1979) presents an early example of the theoretical foundations of the 
gravity model using goods that are differentiated by country of origin along with preferences 
which exhibit a constant elasticity of substitution.  Later extensions, including those of 
Bergstrand (1989) and Deardorff (1998) incorporate monopolistic competition into the 
theoretical foundation.  Within the last decade, Eaton and Kortum (2002) have expanded the 
Ricardian and Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson models to show their compatibility with 
gravity estimation. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) have used CES demand and 
monopolistic competition to construct a model that demonstrates the importance of relative 
trade costs in bilateral trade. Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch (2011) provide an alternative 
framework which does not have the restriction of symmetrical trade costs as in Anderson and 
van Wincoop’s model.  Haveman and Hummels (2004) have also demonstrated with the use 
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of incomplete specialization and trade costs that the gravity model has theoretical 
foundations.  In addition to the theoretical foundations built by the mentioned papers, 
Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001) have shown the effects of the different theories on the 
estimated parameter values. 
As for estimation using the gravity model, Cheng and Wall (2005) outline estimation 
methods that allow for heterogeneity, noting that omitted variables can lead to estimation 
bias. Egger (2002), Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003), and Kandogan (2007) also discuss the use 
of the gravity model in the evaluation of trade blocs.  Among important points from the 
authors are the use of imports as the dependent variable improves the overall fit of the model, 
multi-year average values should not be used, and inclusion of common border, common 
language, and monetary variables should be considered.  In addition, for pooled data, Egger 
and Pfaffermayr (2003) and Kandogan (2007) suggest the use of bilateral, importer, exporter, 
and time fixed effects, with the bilateral effects reflecting uncontrolled factors such as the 
preferential trade agreements. 
III. Data 
The import data used in this essay come from the United Nations Comtrade Database.  
The figures are reported to the UN by individual countries and are listed in terms of the value 
of trade in U.S. dollars.  The import values for the largest EU economies (Germany, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom) from each of the other EU countries 
and twelve other nations are used in the estimation process.  This data is available for most 
countries throughout the sample, the time period from 1994 through 2008, with a few 
exceptions.  Other data come from the Eurostat database and the World Bank, and distances 
are reported by indo.com.  Per capita GDP is reported in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. 
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IV. Model 
Trade displacement is reflected in deviation from an expected value of trade due to certain 
country characteristics, in this case, being a new member to the EU, or an older member.  
The gravity model has been widely used in trade literature to estimate bilateral trade between 
countries.31  The basic model suggests that the value of trade between two countries is 
dependent on the masses of the two countries, i.e. the sizes of their economies, and the 
distance between them, given by the basic equation 
(1) 
stm = u ∙ wtx	 ∙ wtmxyz{Emx$  
where C is a constant, T is trade value in either exports or imports (or the sum), M is mass or 
any variable representing country size and/or endowments, and Dist is the distance between 
countries i (importer) and e (exporter) at time t.  Changing to the terms used for these 
purposes, and including binary variables that represent the inclusion to a particular group of 
countries or year, we have 
   (2) 
wtm = u ∙ ,|y}}utx	 ∗ }~}tx. ∙ ,|y}}utmx$ ∗ }~}tmx&.yz{Emqxa ∙ 
%
4
(,'4  
 
where the value of imports,wtm , to country i from country e at time t is estimated by a 
constant C, the per capita GDPs (in constant 2000 U.S. dollars) of countries i and 
e(|y}}utand	|y}}utm.	, the populations of countries i and e (}~}tand}~}tm., the distance 
between the capitals of country i and country e (yz{Em., as well as a factor influenced by 
                                                           
31
 See Frankel (1997) for discussion on theoretical foundations of the gravity model. 
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which country group the exporter is in and the year.  Taking the natural logarithm of the 
equation results in the equation to be estimated:32 
  (3) 
?wtm = ?u + ?|y}}ut + ?}~}t + %?|y}}utm + '?}~}tm + P?ysm
+ %4  ,
'
4
yy + tm 
where i is the importing country, e is the exporting county, t is the time period, ptis the year 
grouping, and ge is the exporter’s country group.  yand y are dummy variables for 
country group and time period33.  The country groups are the new members in 2004 (y	), 
the core members (the same as the importers selected) (y), and the other members (y$).  
The ROW (y_) group will be omitted and serve as the benchmark group.  The time period 
dummy variables will be the 1997-1999 period (y	), 2000-2002 (y), 2003-2005 (y$), 
and the 2006-2008 (y&) periods.  The 1994-1996 period (y_) will be the benchmark.   
The coefficients would be expected to be positive for the respective GDPPC and POP 
variables, as larger, wealthier economies both import more goods and export more goods.  
Similarly, the coefficient of the DIST variable is expected to be negative (written in this 
form) as countries would be expected to import more from those countries that are 
geographically closer.  The coefficients on the binary variables for country groups will help 
determine the significance, if any, of trade displacement in the expanded EU.  
                                                           
32
 See the appendix for the expanded version of the estimated equation. 
 
33
 With the estimated equation written in this form, y_and y_ are both equivalent to 1.  This allows for 
inclusion of the non-interacted dummy variables.  That is, both yand yare included independently in the 
analysis along with the interaction terms.  See the expanded equation in appendix 2 for more clarity. 
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The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are expected to be informative, but 
interpreting these must be done with caution, given the way that the data has been chosen.  
With only the top 12 exporters from the ROW selected in the data, the trade from the ROW 
groups will appear very strong, possibly stronger than the exports originating from the other 
EU countries.  However, the changes in the values for the γ’s from one time period to another 
will be the points of interest.  For one particular country group, increases (decreases) in 
gamma through the three time periods would suggest that imports to the large EU economies 
from this group have increased (decreased).  In particular, trade displacement would be 
represented by increasing γ’s for the new member group and decreasing γ’s for the other 
member or core groups.  Displacement might also occur with increasing γ’s for the new 
member group at faster rates than increasing γ’s for the other member or core groups. 
 The estimated equation (3) is similar to the equations in the literature to test the 
significance and effect of membership to an organization or institution, such as the WTO in 
the case of Rose (2004) or the EMU in the case of Micco et al (2003).  Also, the use of the 
gravity equation in this format is similar to the strategy employed by Krueger (1999) to 
estimate trade diversion caused by NAFTA, or Wilhelmsson (2006) to estimate trade 
displacement effects of the enlarged EU. 
 In addition to the OLS estimation of equation (3), several other estimations of the 
data will be presented in section VI.  Using the entire sample in the estimation makes the 
assumption that each coefficient that is estimated is the same for each of the individual 
importers.  For example, the results from this estimation assume that the distance between 
trading partners has the same effect on France’s imports as it does on German imports.  The 
choice of the six largest economies in the EU for the sample data suggests that this 
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assumption will hold if countries within this group have similar trade policies and relations 
with outside trading partners.  However, on the other hand, given the differences in country 
characteristics such as location, language, or shared borders among the six countries, arguing 
against this assumption is not a stretch.  For this reason, each individual importer will also 
have the same equation estimated, providing six different estimations.  Though this method 
results in a reduction of sample size, it will allow for comparison between each individual 
importer and the overall sample.  This comparison will help identify if trade displacement is 
occurring in individual countries more or less (if at all) than the group of large importers as a 
whole. 
 In a similar manner to the importers, in terms of aggregation, splitting the exporters 
into the four groups – the y  variable – makes the assumption that the membership to a 
particular group influences exports to the large EU economies in the same way and in a 
different manner than exports from countries of a different group.  The similarity of the 
countries within each of the three European groups is meant to represent two characteristics – 
one being the level of integration within the EU and the other being a proxy for overall skill 
level.  One objective of this analysis is to examine if the reduction in trade frictions that 
accompany entrance into the union causes trade displacement within the EU.  The countries 
in the new member group are the countries involved in the enlargement of the EU-15 to EU-
25 and EU-27.  Of the EU-15 members, they are divided by the size of the economies, with 
the ‘core’ members being the same six countries for which the import data was collected.  
While there would be some reorganization if done strictly, the division of the exporters into 
groups represents both a depth of integration element as well as a more traditional 
north/south separation. 
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 Absent from the estimated model are terms that include exchange rates and inflation 
rates.  With import values and per capita GDP reported in U.S. dollars, exchange rate 
fluctuation should not be ignored.  In addition, while per capita GDP is reported in real 
terms, import values are in nominal values, leaving inflation rate fluctuation as another 
important aspect of the model.  Without adding additional variables, variation in these two 
terms, country inflation and exchange rates, is captured in the estimated model by the time 
period dummy variables.  Interpretation of the changes in the estimated coefficients for the 
period dummies will reflect this variation. 
V. Descriptive Statistics 
Imports to the largest six economies of the EU are used to test the model34 - Germany, 
France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands.  These six countries also 
account for the majority of imports destined for the EU, as can be seen in Figure 3.1.  Theses 
six countries account for approximately two-thirds of all imports destined for the EU. 
Figure 3.1 - 2008 Nominal value of imports of selected EU countries 
 
 
                                                           
34In terms of Nominal GDP according to the CIA World Factbook. 
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The six economies are also heavily dependent on one another as a source of imports, as can 
be seen in the table in Appendix II.  Noteworthy is the fact that Germany is the top exporter 
to each of the other five countries in the sample. 
While Figure 3.1 and Appendix II provide recent snapshots of imports to the largest 
economies, of particular importance to the topic of trade displacement are the changes in the 
sources of their imports, if any.   Figures 3.2a through 3.2f demonstrate the changes in the 
share of imports from select countries. The countries selected are the largest three (other) 
economies and the two largest new members of the EU-27.     
As a cautionary note, trade share alone will not shed a clear light on whether or not 
the trade displacement effects are significant.  As trade creation is expected to take place 
between the new and old members, that effect alone might result in the share of imports 
decreasing from other members.  For example, if Germany begins to import more goods from 
the Czech Republic, the share of imports from France may decrease despite Germany’s 
nominal imports from France remaining constant, decreasing, or even increasing.  However, 
as Figure 3.3 shows, examination of the nominal values in this way is difficult to analyze.  
The nominal values often move in the same direction, particularly after 2002 when imports 
from nearly every country increased. 
With this caution taken into account, Figures 3.2a – 3.2f remain informative.  Imports 
from France and the UK decrease, in terms of import share, by approximately 5%.  
Considering the large value of imports to these countries – Germany’s total imports in 2008 
valued $1.2 trillion – a slight change in trade share indicates a fairly large change in nominal 
import value.  
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Figure 3.2 a-f – Share of country imports 
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Figure 3.3 - Nominal Value of German Imports 
 
Conversely to imports from France and the UK, imports from Germany to the other large 
economies of the EU remain much more constant in terms of share of imports.  Imports from 
the Czech Republic and Poland to the large EU economies increase in trade share, 
particularly in Germany.   
VI. Results 
A. Entire Sample 
The detailed results of the estimation of equation (3) using the entire sample are 
presented in Appendix IV.  The estimated coefficients of the GDPPC, population, and 
distance variables are all significant and in the direction predicted.  The coefficients of the 
dummy variable and interaction terms are presented in Table 3.1 with standard errors in 
parentheses: 
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Table 3.1 OLS estimates of γ (* indicates 95% significance level) 
  ROW New Core Other 
  4   % 
1994-1996 4 0.000 -0.728* (0.082) 0.189* (0.094) 0.102 (0.083) 
1997-1999  0.010 (0.074) 0.088 (0.097) -0.028 (0.124) -0.072 (0.106) 
2000-2002  0.127 (0.071) 0.096 (0.096) -0.245* (0.122) -0.235* (0.103) 
2003-2005 % 0.429* (0.072) 0.167 (0.096) -0.299* (0.122) -0.243* (0.103) 
2006-2008 ' 0.728* (0.072) 0.215* (0.096) -0.423* (0.122) -0.368* (0.103) 
 
One important note is that the base estimation (all dummy variables equal to zero) is for the 
ROW group in the 1994-1996 period.  Because the dummy variables are not in logarithmic 
form, adding the coefficient results in a scaling of the base estimation.  For example, the core 
group estimated coefficient for the 1994-1996 period of 0.189 results in trade originating 
from the core members being exp(0.189) = 1.208 times the values of imports from the base 
group, or 20.8% higher, after also including the changes in imports due to the differences in 
the GDP, POP, and DIST variables. 
Because both the individual dummy variables yand y are included along with the 
interaction of the two35 in the regression, a conversion of the estimated coefficients is needed 
before analyzing the results.  Define λ with the following stipulations according to the values 
of e and t for yand y: 
If t = 0 or e = 0, then , = , 
If t and e> 0, then , = ,+ ,_ + _,  
                                                           
35As indicated above, yy_  is equivalent to y , and thus, ,_  is the estimated coefficient on the (non-
interacted) y  variable.  Similarly, y_y is equivalent to y and _,  is the estimated coefficient on the y 
variable. 
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So for either of the benchmark cases (ROW or 1994-96 period), the estimated coefficient γ 
reported in Table 3.1 has the same value for λ.  However, because of the inclusion of the non-
interacted dummies and the interaction terms, the estimated value of λ is the sum of three 
estimates of γ: one for the interaction term, and one each for the non-interacted terms. 
As an example, a data point of imports to France from Portugal in 2004 would be 
written as: 
?w44'omot
= ?u + ?|y}}u44'om + ?}~}44'om + %?|y}}u44'ot
+ '?}~}44't + P?ysomot 
+	3,0y3 + 0,3y3 + 3,3y3y3 + 44'omt 
As a more general example of similar imports, the estimated value of  $,$ , the coefficient 
for imports from one of the other members in the 2003-2005 period is (-0.243 + 0.429 + 
0.102) = 0.288, as all three terms would have a dummy value of 1 in the estimation.36  
Converting to the scale, exp(0.288) = 1.334, or imports to the core from the other members in 
2003-2005 are about 133% of the value of imports from the base group after also including 
the changes in imports due to the differences in GDPs.  Table 3.2 presents the estimates of λ 
for the various exporter groups and periods. 
Caution must be taken when interpreting some of these estimated coefficients, as not 
all estimated coefficients are significantly different than zero37.  In particular, estimates that 
include the earlier years (1997-1999) are rarely significant.  This may not come as a large 
surprise, however, as the difference in trade (that is not accounted for by changes to the base 
                                                           
36
 These values are the corresponding estimates of γ from Table 3.1. 
 
37
 See appendix 3 for regression results and tests of significance. 
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variables GDP, GDPPC, or POP) from the base period to the DY1 period would not be 
expected to be large. 
Table 3.2 OLS estimates of λ (* indicates 95% significance level) 
  ROW New Core Other 
  4   % 
1994-1996 4 0.000  -0.728* (0.082) 0.189* (0.094) 0.102 (0.083) 
1997-1999  0.010 (0.074) -0.629* (0.081) 0.171 (0.094) 0.040 (0.082) 
2000-2002  0.127 (0.071) -0.505* (0.081) 0.071 (0.094) -0.006 (0.081) 
2003-2005 % 0.429* (0.072) -0.133 (0.080) 0.319* (0.094) 0.288* (0.081) 
2006-2008 ' 0.728* (0.072) 0.216* (0.080) 0.495* (0.095) 0.463* (0.081) 
 
Of particular importance to the issue of trade displacement is the change in the estimated 
imports from the various groups, as this would allow us to examine if the effects of the 
various country groups change over time.  Namely, examination of  , − ,	 will 
allow analysis of trade displacement in the sample.   
Table 3.3 shows the change in estimates of , from the previous time period. 
Table 3.3 OLS estimates of , −  ,I (* indicates 95% 
significance level) 
  ROW New Core Other 
  4   % 
1994-1996 4 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
1997-1999  0.010 (0.074) 0.098 (0.123) -0.018 (0.169) -0.062 (0.138) 
2000-2002  0.117 (0.070) 0.124 (0.064) -0.101 (0.099) -0.046 (0.073) 
2003-2005 % 0.302* (0.067) 0.372* (0.064) 0.248* (0.099) 0.294* (0.070) 
2006-2008 ' 0.300* (0.067) 0.348* (0.065) 0.176 (0.099) 0.175* (0.070) 
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Evidence of trade displacement would occur if the estimates for the new members were 
increasing while estimates for the core and/or other members were decreasing, or if the 
estimates for the new members were increasing faster than those for the core and/or other 
groups.  There is some evidence of trade displacement in the results.  The new members 
show an increase in the estimate of λ in each of the periods over the previous period.  In fact, 
the estimates of λ are increasing at an increasing rate until the last period.  In addition, the 
movement from period 1 to period 2 and again from period 2 to 3 results in a decrease in the 
estimate of λ for both the core and other members.  However, caution should be taken when 
interpreting these results, as the estimates are not significant for any group in the first three 
periods.  For the core and other members, the estimates increase from the previous period for 
the final two periods, but are well below the rate at which the estimates are increasing for the 
new members. 
These results provide moderate evidence of trade displacement.  In the early periods 
of the sample, after accounting for the expected changes in imports resulting from changes in 
populations and GDPPC, the core EU countries are increasing their imports from the new 
members while decreasing the imports from core and other members.  In the later periods of 
the sample, the core members are importing more from all sources (again, after accounting 
for changes in populations and GDPPCs), but have increased their imports from the new 
members by a larger rate than the core or other members. 
B. Individual Countries 
a. OLS Estimation 
A similar model is estimated for each of the individual importing countries to 
examine if trade displacement is occurring at different levels for the six large importers.  The 
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results from these six regressions are presented in Appendix V, and they are summarized in 
the Tables 3.4-3.6. 
Of particular interest is the analysis of Table 3.6, as trade displacement occurring in 
the individual countries would be seen in the changes in imports from one period to the next.  
In nearly every period for each country, the estimated change in λ from the previous period is 
greater for imports coming from the new members than the corresponding estimate for 
imports from the core or other members, with the only exceptions being Dutch imports in 
period 2 and German imports in period 3.  Even instances where the corresponding values in 
Table 3.6 are negative for both the new members and the core or other members, the values 
are less negative, suggesting the change in imports from new members is not necessarily 
increasing, but decreasing at a slower rate than imports from the two other groups.  This fact 
suggests that there is some level of trade displacement occurring in the sample, though it  
occurs in different magnitudes and at different times for the countries in the sample. 
For France, there is a larger difference between the estimated change in λ for imports 
from the new members compared to the core or other members in the first three periods, but 
only a small difference in period 4, suggesting that any trade displacement occurred early in 
the sample. In addition, the estimated values for the core and other members are similar 
throughout, which would indicate that imports are not switching away from only one of those 
groups.  Estimates in the change in λ for German imports are also greater for imports from 
the new members than the other two groups in the first two periods, but these differences are 
smaller than that of the estimates for France.  In addition, there is nearly no difference 
between the change in λ for German imports from the new members, core members, or other 
members in the last two periods of the sample. 
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 Table 3.4 – OLS estimates of γ (* indicates 95% significance level) 
 
FR ROW New Core Other GE ROW New Core Other 
 4   %  4   % 4 0.000 -0.709* 0.355 0.178 4 0.000 -0.715* -0.162 -0.296 
 
 
(0.190) (0.223) (0.193)  
 
(0.17) (0.185) (0.169)  -0.171 0.155 -0.022 -0.054  -0.212 0.153 0.042 -0.028 
 (0.215) (0.229) -0.290 -0.250  (0.193) (0.195) (0.247) (0.213)  -0.333 0.305 -0.183 -0.122  -0.288 0.186 -0.176 -0.123 
 (0.321) (0.224) (0.286) (0.242)  (0.286) (0.191) (0.244) (0.206) % -0.245 0.500* -0.260 -0.213 % 0.038 0.151 -0.247 -0.145 
 (0.361) (0.224) (0.286) (0.242)  -0.32 (0.191) (0.244) (0.206) ' -0.185 0.475* -0.378 -0.343 ' 0.143 0.084 -0.323 -0.238 
 (0.458) (0.225) (0.286) (0.241)  (0.389) (0.192) (0.244) (0.205) 
  
    
  
    
NE ROW New Core Other SP ROW New Core Other 
 4   %  4   % 4 0.000 0.028 0.056 0.526* 4 0.000 -1.182* 0.733* 0.333 
 
 
(0.191) -0.22 (0.193)  
 
(0.176) (0.209) (0.181)  -0.157 0.032 -0.113 -0.048  -0.143 0.158 -0.032 -0.095 
 (0.218) (0.226) (0.286) (0.248)  (0.216) (0.212) (0.269) (0.231)  -0.096 -0.170 -0.222 -0.159  -0.269 0.352 -0.307 -0.307 
 (0.302) (0.221) (0.282) (0.238)  (0.313) (0.208) (0.265) (0.223) % 0.288 -0.188 -0.367 -0.228 % -0.139 0.344 -0.385 -0.352 
 (0.379) (0.221) (0.282) (0.238)  (0.354) (0.208) (0.265) (0.223) ' 0.519 -0.167 -0.511 -0.42 ' -0.129 0.508* -0.537* -0.426 
 (0.430) (0.222) (0.282) (0.238)  (0.431) (0.209) (0.265) (0.223) 
          
IT ROW New Core Other UK ROW New Core Other 
 4   %  4   % 4 0.000 -1.244* 0.108 -0.272 4 0.000 -0.567* 0.457* 0.359 
  (0.194) (0.220) (0.195)   (0.186) -0.22 (0.191)  -0.118 0.030 0.015 0.021  0.047 0.024 -0.035 -0.194 
 (0.219) (0.231) (0.293) (0.252)  (0.225) (0.223) (0.283) (0.244)  -0.064 -0.065 -0.340 -0.175  0.081 -0.004 -0.211 -0.370 
 (0.345) (0.226) (0.289) (0.243)  (0.321) (0.219) (0.279) (0.236) % -0.025 -0.008 -0.368 -0.145 % 0.181 0.229 -0.129 -0.217 
 (0.376) (0.226) (0.289) (0.243)  (0.386) (0.219) (0.279) (0.236) ' -0.053 0.149 -0.500 -0.257 ' 0.348 0.289 -0.246 -0.361 
 (0.473) (0.227) (0.289) (0.243)  (0.451) (0.220) (0.279) (0.236) 
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Table 3.5 – OLS estimates of λ (* indicates 95% significance level) 
 
FR ROW New Core Other GE ROW New Core Other 
 4   %  4   % 4 0.000 -0.709* 0.355 0.178 4 0.000 -0.715* -0.162 -0.296 
 
 
(0.190) (0.223) (0.193) 
  
(0.170) (0.185) (0.169)  -0.171 -0.725* 0.162 -0.047  -0.212 -0.774* -0.332 -0.536* 
 (0.215) (0.227) (0.256) (0.231) 
 
(0.193) (0.210) (0.223) (0.209)  -0.333 -0.737* -0.161 -0.277  -0.288 -0.817* -0.626* -0.707* 
 (0.321) (0.332) (0.352) (0.331) 
 
(0.286) (0.301) (0.310) (0.297) % -0.245 -0.454 -0.150 -0.280 % 0.038 -0.526 -0.371 -0.403 
 (0.361) (0.371) (0.389) (0.370) 
 
(0.32) (0.332) (0.341) (0.330) ' -0.185 -0.419 -0.208 -0.350 ' 0.143 -0.488 -0.342 -0.391 
 (0.458) (0.465) (0.480) (0.465) 
 
(0.389) (0.398) (0.406) (0.397) 
  
         
NE ROW New Core Other SP ROW New Core Other 
 4   %  4   % 4 0.000 0.028 0.056 0.526* 4 0.000 -1.182* 0.733* 0.333 
 
 
(0.191) (0.22) (0.193) 
  
(0.176) (0.209) (0.181)  -0.157 -0.097 -0.214 0.321  -0.143 -1.167* 0.558* 0.095 
 (0.218) (0.233) (0.257) (0.235) 
 
(0.216) (0.226) (0.253) (0.232)  -0.096 -0.238 -0.262 0.271  -0.269 -1.099* 0.157 -0.243 
 (0.302) (0.317) (0.335) (0.316) 
 
(0.313) (0.323) (0.343) (0.323) % 0.288 0.128 -0.023 0.586 % -0.139 -0.977* 0.209 -0.158 
 (0.379) (0.391) (0.405) (0.390) 
 
(0.354) (0.363) (0.380) (0.363) ' 0.519 0.380 0.064 0.625 ' -0.129 -0.803 0.067 -0.222 
 (0.43) (0.439) (0.453) (0.440) 
 
(0.431) (0.438) (0.453) (0.439) 
     	     
IT ROW New Core Other UK ROW New Core Other 
 4   %  4   % 4 0.000 -1.244* 0.108 -0.272 4 0.000 -0.567* 0.457* 0.359 
  (0.194) (0.220) (0.195)   (0.186) (0.220) (0.191)  -0.118 -1.332* 0.005 -0.369  0.047 -0.496* 0.469 0.212 
 (0.219) (0.237) (0.256) (0.234)  (0.225) (0.237) (0.264) (0.241)  -0.064 -1.373* -0.296 -0.511  0.081 -0.490 0.327 0.070 
 (0.345) (0.357) (0.372) (0.354)  (0.321) (0.333) (0.353) (0.333) % -0.025 -1.277* -0.285 -0.442 % 0.181 -0.157 0.509 0.323 
 (0.376) (0.387) (0.401) (0.384)  (0.386) (0.395) (0.412) (0.395) ' -0.053 -1.148* -0.445 -0.582 ' 0.348 0.070 0.559 0.346 
 (0.473) (0.482) (0.494) (0.480)  (0.451) (0.458) (0.473) (0.459) 
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Table 3.6 OLS estimates , −  ,I (* indicates 95% significance level) 
 
FR ROW New Core Other GE ROW New Core Other 
 4   %  4   % 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
          -0.171 -0.016 -0.193 -0.225  -0.212 -0.059 -0.170 -0.240 
 (0.215) (0.197) (0.265) (0.224) 
 
(0.193) (0.179) (0.234) (0.199)  -0.162 -0.012 -0.323 -0.230  -0.076 -0.043 -0.294 -0.171 
 (0.220) (0.211) (0.277) (0.223) 
 
(0.188) (0.180) (0.236) (0.191) % 0.088 0.283 0.011 -0.003 % 0.326* 0.291* 0.255 0.304* 
 (0.214) (0.209) (0.275) (0.220) 
 
(0.140) (0.135) (0.203) (0.147) ' 0.060 0.035 -0.058 -0.070 ' 0.105 0.038 0.029 0.012 
 (0.207) (0.202) (0.270) (0.213) 
 
(0.187) (0.183) (0.238) (0.192) 
  
         
NE ROW New Core Other SP ROW New Core Other 
 4   %  4   % 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
          -0.157 -0.125 -0.270 -0.205  -0.143 0.015 -0.175 -0.238 
 (0.218) (0.200) (0.266) (0.226) 
 
(0.217) (0.201) (0.260) (0.224)  0.061 -0.141 -0.048 -0.050  -0.126 0.068 -0.401 -0.338 
 (0.214) (0.205) (0.270) (0.220) 
 
(0.201) (0.193) (0.254) (0.204) % 0.384 0.366 0.239 0.315 % 0.130 0.122 0.052 0.085 
 (0.202) (0.197) (0.264) (0.207) 
 
(0.188) (0.183) (0.247) (0.194) ' 0.231 0.252 0.087 0.039 ' 0.010 0.174 -0.142 -0.064 
 (0.195) (0.191) (0.259) (0.201) 
 
(0.193) (0.188) (0.250) (0.198) 
          
IT ROW New Core Other UK ROW New Core Other 
 4   %  4   % 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
           -0.118 -0.088 -0.103 -0.097  0.047 0.071 0.012 -0.147 
 (0.219) (0.201) (0.270) (0.227)  (0.225) (0.208) (0.271) (0.233)  0.054 -0.041 -0.301 -0.142  0.034 0.006 -0.142 -0.142 
 (0.236) (0.228) (0.290) (0.240)  (0.206) (0.197) (0.263) (0.210) % 0.039 0.096 0.011 0.069 % 0.100 0.333 0.182 0.253 
 (0.200) (0.195) (0.265) (0.206)  (0.181) (0.176) (0.247) (0.187) ' -0.028 0.129 -0.160 -0.140 ' 0.167 0.227 0.050 0.023 
 (0.213) (0.208) (0.275) (0.219)  (0.206) (0.201) (0.266) (0.212) 
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Conversely, the estimates for the changes in λ presented in Table 3.6 for Italian 
imports show the greatest differences between the new members and the core or other 
members in period 4, suggesting that trade displacement occurred later in the sample.  Dutch 
and British imports both showed some signs of trade displacement in both the third and 
fourth periods, but to a lesser extent. Also, in each period, the estimate for the core members 
was lower than that of the other members, suggesting that Italian imports were switching 
away from the core members as a source.  This is also true for Spanish imports in every 
period except the first.  In fact, the estimates of the change in λ for Spain show the largest 
differences between imports originating from the new members and those originating from 
either the core or other members, which suggests that Spanish imports showed the most 
evidence of trade displacement, and that much of this displacement occurred more with the 
switching of imports away from the core members as a source. 
Some observations regarding the significance of the results presented in the above 
tables when interpreting the results are also warranted.  In general, there is a lack of 
significance at the 95% level for many of the estimates of γ, λ, and changes in λ.  Because of 
this, strong conclusions about the level of trade displacement cannot be made.  However, the 
significance of some of the estimates of λ in Table 3.5, particularly the estimates involving 
the imports from the new members, does suggest a trend of increasing imports from these 
countries. 
b. SUR Estimation 
While the results from the six separate regressions above may provide some 
information into the trade displacement taking place among the individual countries, 
unobservable factors in each of the six separate equations are likely correlated across the 
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equations, resulting in correlation in the error terms, tm, across regressions.  To correct for 
this, all six equations are estimated simultaneously using the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) technique.  The results from this estimation are presented in Appendix VI.  
The Breusch-Pagan test confirms that the residuals are not independent, and the seemingly 
unrelated estimation is a better approach than OLS, which results in inefficient, though still 
unbiased, estimates.  Using this method of estimation, only trade displacement between the 
new members and the other members can be examined, as the DG2 variable is omitted in the 
regression.  The results for the estimation of the coefficients of the dummy variable and 
interaction terms are presented in Tables 3.7 - 3.9. Table 3.7 presents the estimates of γ, 
Table 3.8 presents the estimates of λ, and Table 3.9 presents the change in the estimate of λ 
from the previous period. 
Another advantage of using SUR is that it enables using a straightforward method to 
test if the estimated coefficients are the same across equations, or across countries in this 
case.  Each estimated coefficient was tested against the estimated coefficient of the 
corresponding variable for each country pair, as well as across all countries.  For example, 
the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the exporter population is the same in both the 
estimation for French imports and German imports, and another test is to see if the estimated 
coefficient is the same for all six countries.   
The hypotheses of equality among the estimated coefficients for the five standard 
gravity variables – population of exporter and importer, per capita GDP of exporter and 
importer, and the distance variable – was rejected in some cases, but not in others for the 
pairwise tests.  Not surprisingly since each equation was constructed with just the one 
importer, there were more rejections of the null hypothesis in the cases of the exporter 
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variables, and the distance variable.  This is confirmed by the test across all equations, as 
seen in Table 3.10. 
Also of note is that the hypothesis of equality among the estimated coefficients for the 
distance variable is rejected in all but one case.  As shown in Table 3.11, the effect that 
distance has on each individual country’s imports is different in nearly every case. 
 
 
 
Table 3.7 – SUR estimates of γ (* indicates 95% significance level) 
 
Fr ROW New Other Ger ROW New Other It ROW New Other 
 4  %  4  %  4  % 4 0.000 -0.686* 0.167 4 0.000 -0.620* -0.239 4 0.000 -1.112* -0.183 
 
 (0.188) (0.190) 
 
 (0.171) (0.171) 
 
 (0.198) (0.199)  -0.154 0.154 -0.048  -0.152 0.150 -0.011  -0.054 0.024 0.012 
 
(0.203) (0.225) (0.247) 
 
(0.190) (0.200) (0.220) 
 
(0.214) (0.236) (0.259)  -0.282 0.301 -0.127  -0.150 0.179 -0.127  0.083 -0.073 -0.177 
 
(0.292) (0.221) (0.238) 
 
(0.277) (0.196) (0.211) 
 
(0.319) (0.232) (0.249) % -0.091 0.495* -0.216 % 0.184 0.144 -0.147 % 0.217 -0.017 -0.146 
 
(0.344) (0.221) (0.238) 
 
(0.306) (0.196) (0.211) 
 
(0.361) (0.232) (0.249) ' 0.065 0.468* -0.345 ' 0.387 0.075 -0.239 ' 0.309 0.139 -0.258 
 
(0.435) (0.222) (0.238) 
 
(0.379) (0.197) (0.211) 
 
(0.456) (0.232) (0.249) 
               
Ne ROW New Other Sp ROW New Other UK ROW New Other 
 4  %  4  %  4  % 4 0.000 0.027 0.530* 4 0.000 -1.174* 0.335 4 0.000 -0.569* 0.376 
 
 (0.194) (0.196) 
 
 (0.181) (0.184) 
 
 (0.191) (0.195)  -0.144 0.032 -0.047  -0.186 0.158 -0.073  -0.109 0.026 -0.090 
 
(0.221) (0.230) (0.253) 
 
(0.210) (0.217) (0.238) 
 
(0.225) (0.227) (0.249)  -0.053 -0.168 -0.153  -0.310 0.350 -0.308  -0.177 -0.001 -0.361 
 
(0.312) (0.226) (0.243) 
 
(0.298) (0.213) (0.229) 
 
(0.323) (0.223) (0.240) % 0.363 -0.186 -0.222 % -0.081 0.342 -0.353 % -0.033 0.232 -0.209 
 
(0.381) (0.226) (0.243) 
 
(0.349) (0.213) (0.229) 
 
(0.399) (0.223) (0.240) ' 0.591 -0.165 -0.415 ' 0.034 0.505* -0.427 ' 0.310 0.289 -0.353 
 
(0.445) (0.227) (0.243) 
 
(0.427) (0.214) (0.229) 
 
(0.478) (0.224) (0.240) 
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Table 3.8 – SUR estimates of λ (* indicates 95% significance level) 
 
Fr ROW New Other Ger ROW New Other It ROW New Other 
 4  %  4  %  4  % 4 0.000 -0.686* 0.167 4 0.000 -0.620* -0.239 4 0.000 -1.112* -0.183 
 
 (0.188) (0.190) 
 
 (0.171) (0.171) 
 
 (0.198) (0.199)  -0.154 -0.686* -0.035  -0.152 -0.622* -0.403*  -0.054 -1.142* -0.224 
 
(0.203) (0.217) (0.219) 
 
(0.190) (0.206) (0.205) 
 
(0.214) (0.229) (0.230)  -0.282 -0.667* -0.241  -0.150 -0.591* -0.516  0.083 -1.103* -0.277 
 
(0.292) (0.306) (0.304) 
 
(0.277) (0.290) (0.287) 
 
(0.319) (0.333) (0.330) % -0.091 -0.281 -0.140 % 0.184 -0.292 -0.202 % 0.217 -0.912* -0.112 
 
(0.344) (0.355) (0.353) 
 
(0.306) (0.318) (0.316) 
 
(0.361) (0.373) (0.370) ' 0.065 -0.152 -0.113 ' 0.387 -0.157 -0.091 ' 0.309 -0.665 -0.131 
 
(0.435) (0.443) (0.443) 
 
(0.379) (0.388) (0.387) 
 
(0.456) (0.466) (0.464) 
Ne ROW New Other Sp ROW New Other UK ROW New Other 
 4  %  4  %  4  % 4 0.000 0.027 0.530* 4 0.000 -1.174* 0.335 4 0.000 -0.569* 0.376 
 
0.000 (0.194) (0.196) 
 
 (0.181) (0.184) 
 
 (0.191) (0.195)  -0.144 -0.086 0.340  -0.186 -1.202* 0.075  -0.109 -0.653* 0.176 
 
(0.221) (0.236) (0.238) 
 
(0.210) (0.222) (0.224) 
 
(0.225) (0.239) (0.242)  -0.053 -0.194 0.324  -0.310 -1.133* -0.284  -0.177 -0.746* -0.162 
 
(0.312) (0.327) (0.325) 
 
(0.298) (0.310) (0.309) 
 
(0.323) (0.336) (0.336) % 0.363 0.203 0.671 % -0.081 -0.913* -0.100 % -0.033 -0.370 0.134 
 
(0.381) (0.393) (0.392) 
 
(0.349) (0.359) (0.358) 
 
(0.399) (0.410) (0.410) ' 0.591 0.453 0.706 ' 0.034 -0.635 -0.058 ' 0.310 0.031 0.333 
 
(0.445) (0.453) (0.454) 
 
(0.427) (0.435) (0.435) 
 
(0.478) (0.486) (0.487) 
 
Table 3.9 – SUR estimates , − ,I (* indicates 95% significance level) 
 
Fr ROW New Other Ger ROW New Other It ROW New Other 
 4  %  4  %  4  %  -0.154 0.000 -0.202  -0.152 -0.003 -0.164  -0.054 -0.029 -0.042 
 
(0.203) (0.184) (0.212) 
 
(0.190) (0.175) (0.198) 
 
(0.214) (0.195) (0.223)  -0.128 0.019 -0.206  0.002 0.031 -0.113  0.137 0.039 -0.052 
 
(0.208) (0.199) (0.215) 
 
(0.187) (0.179) (0.193) 
 
(0.227) (0.218) (0.234) % 0.191 0.385* 0.101 % 0.334* 0.299* 0.314* % 0.134 0.190 0.165 
 
(0.195) (0.190) (0.201) 
 
(0.142) (0.136) (0.149) 
 
(0.193) (0.187) (0.199) ' 0.156 0.129 0.027 ' 0.203 0.135 0.111 ' 0.092 0.248 -0.019 
 
(0.194) (0.189) (0.200) 
 
(0.178) (0.173) (0.183) 
 
(0.206) (0.201) (0.213) 
Ne ROW New Other Sp ROW New Other UK ROW New Other 
 4  %  4  %  4  %  -0.144 -0.112 -0.190  -0.186 -0.028 -0.260  -0.109 -0.084 -0.199 
 
(0.221) (0.203) (0.229) 
 
(0.210) (0.193) (0.218) 
 
(0.225) (0.208) (0.233)  0.091 -0.108 -0.015  -0.124 0.069 -0.359  -0.068 -0.094 -0.339 
 
(0.215) (0.206) (0.222) 
 
(0.200) (0.191) (0.206) 
 
(0.210) (0.201) (0.217) % 0.416* 0.397* 0.346 % 0.229 0.221 0.184 % 0.144 0.377* 0.296 
 
(0.190) (0.184) (0.196) 
 
(0.183) (0.178) (0.189) 
 
(0.186) (0.181) (0.193) ' 0.228 0.250 0.036 ' 0.115 0.278 0.041 ' 0.343 0.400* 0.198 
 
(0.189) (0.184) (0.195) 
 
(0.187) (0.182) (0.193) 
 
(0.202) (0.197) (0.208) 
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Table 3.10 – Tests of equality across all six equations of SUR for standard gravity model 
variables 
 Χ
2
 (df=5) Prob>Χ
2
 
Exporter Population 143.24 0.000 
Importer Population 6.59 0.253 
Exporter Per Capita GDP 66.52 0.000 
Importer Per Capita GDP 1.34 0.931 
Distance 178.44 0.000 
  
Table 3.11 – Test of equality of estimated coefficients of distance variable for each pair of 
countries.  Values are Χ2 with p-values in parentheses 
 France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain 
Germany 10.41     
 (0.001)     
Italy 103.79 75.65    
 (0.000) (0.000)    
Netherlands 3.59 19.77 99.59   
 (0.058) (0.000) (0.000)   
Spain 7.74 0.19 43.44 18.91  
 (0.005) (0.666) (0.000) (0.000)  
UK 45.97 77.31 161.35 43.44 65.09 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Tests of equality for the estimated changes in imports from each country group over 
the previous period were also performed, again both by each country pair and across all 
equations.  To clarify, each value in Table 3.9 was tested to see if it was equal to the 
corresponding value from another country, and they were also tested as a group.  The results 
of the tests reveal that the null hypotheses of equality between the corresponding coefficients 
can rarely be rejected in the pairwise tests.38,39  The pairwise tests consist of fifteen tests 
(similar to that of Table 3.11) for each of the twelve values reported in Table 3.9.   
                                                           
38
 Of the 180 possible pairs of corresponding coefficients, only the case of the change in imports from Other 
members from periods 1 to 2 for the imports to UK and the Netherlands can the null be rejected, and only at the 
90% confidence level. 
 
39
 The results of these tests are available from the author. 
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The results of the test for equality across all six countries, as opposed to equality between 
corresponding values for just two countries, are shown in Table 3.12. 
 
Table 3.12 – Test of equality across all six equations of SUR for estimates of changes in total 
effects (values in Table 3.9) 
  
Χ
2
 (df=5) 
 
Prob>Χ
2
 
ROW, t=1 0.79 0.978 
ROW, t=2 3.78 0.581 
ROW, t=3 5.21 0.391 
ROW, t=4 1.19 0.946 
   
New Member, t=1 0.34 0.997 
New Member, t=2 0.79 0.978 
New Member, t=3 1.83 0.873 
New Member, t=4 2.72 0.743 
   
Other Member, t=1 1.53 0.909 
Other Member, t=2 6.65 0.248 
Other Member, t=3 2.41 0.790 
Other Member, t=4 1.36 0.929 
 
Referring back to Tables 3.7 – 3.9 the results of the SUR do provide some evidence 
of trade displacement, as the importers are switching away from the other members as a 
source of imports to the new members.  In examining the results in the above tables, 
particularly Table 3.9, in nearly every case the change in the estimate of λ over the previous 
period is greater for the new members than the other members.  In some cases, the estimate is 
positive for the new members while negative for the other members, indicating an increase in 
imports from the new members over the previous period and a decrease in imports from the 
other members over the previous period, which is considered trade displacement.  In 
addition, in the cases where both estimates of λ for the new members and the other members 
are positive, a larger value for the new members indicates that imports from those new 
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members are growing faster than imports from the other members.  While these are important 
results, many of the estimates of λ, and even more so of the estimates of the changes in λ in 
Table 3.9 are not significant at the 95% level.  Therefore, while some conclusions can be 
reached from the results, definitive statements about trade displacement are difficult to make 
based on these results. 
In analyzing each individual country, nearly all six importers showed evidence of 
trade displacement in the early periods, p1 and p2, of the sample, as shown in the estimates 
presented in Table 3.9.  French and Spanish imports showed the greatest difference in 
changes between the new members and other members over the previous period.  For French 
imports, estimates for the change in λ for the other members, $, − $,	, were negative 
in the first two periods, while the corresponding changes for the new members had positive 
estimates of changes in λ.  In period 1 for French imports, there was a 0.202 difference 
between the change in λ from the previous period for the new members compared to the 
other members, and 0.225, 0.284, and 0.102 differences in periods 2, 3, and 4, respectively, 
demonstrating that French imports from new members were increasing at rates faster than 
that of imports from the other members.40 
For Spanish imports, there are similar results.  In the first two periods, the changes in 
the estimates of λ for the other members are negative, -0.260 and -0.359, while the 
corresponding estimates for the new members are -0.028 and 0.069 for change in λ in periods 
1 and 2, respectively.  These differences of 0.231 and 0.427 suggest trade displacement has 
occurred as Spanish imports increased from the new members but not the other members. In 
periods 3 and 4, these differences are 0.037 and 0.236. 
                                                           
40
 These differences are equivalent to 	, − 	,	 −	,, − ,	.. For example, the 0.20 difference 
referred to in the text is calculated by, from Table 3.9, the 0.000 estimate for (g1, p1) minus the -0.202 estimate 
foe (g3, p1). 
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These estimates follow a similar pattern for the imports to the United Kingdom.  The 
difference between the changes in λ from the previous periods for the new members 
compared to the corresponding estimate for the other members were 0.116, 0.245, 0.080, and 
0.202 for periods 1 through 4, respectively.  For Italian imports, the differences in those same 
estimates are 0.012, 0.091, 0.025, and 0.267; for Dutch imports, the differences in estimates 
are 0.078, -0.093, 0.052, and 0.214; and for German imports, the differences in estimates are 
0.161, 0.144, -0.014, and 0.023.  For these three countries, the values of these differences are 
smaller than those differences in estimates for France, Spain, and to some extent, the U.K.  
This would suggest that the levels of trade displacement in Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Italy were smaller than that of France, Spain, and the U.K.  As noted earlier in the text, the 
estimates of the change in λ over the previous period were not always statistically 
significantly different than zero, so the conclusions made from them must be taken with 
caution. 
VII. Conclusions  
The results of the above analysis provide some evidence that trade displacement has 
occurred as the EU expanded from 15 to 27 countries.  The estimates of the models suggest 
that core EU countries of Germany, France, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom have increased the imports sourced from the new members at rates faster than those 
imports sourced from other members.  There is also some evidence that imports from the new 
members have also increased while imports from other members have decreased after 
accounting for changes in country characteristics. 
There are several extensions of the above analysis which would be useful in further 
identifying the existence of trade displacement.  As explained above, the selection of 
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countries in the sample may have biased the results, with the imports from the ROW group 
appearing larger than normal.  This, however, should not have any overly significant effects, 
as the magnitudes of the estimates are not as vital as the changes in those estimates over time.  
Secondly, the countries are currently grouped for the duration of the sample. Allowing the 
country groups to vary over time – the new members were part of the ROW until accession 
in reality – could change the results.  Perhaps also including a group for potential new 
member countries would be helpful as well.  Thirdly, adding addition binary variables for 
characteristics such as a shared border or language would help increase the accuracy of the 
estimates.  Finally, changing the year groupings to match significant changes in EU 
membership might also allow for more interesting interpretations. 
Nevertheless, the above analysis does provide some evidence, though not definitive, 
that trade displacement has occurred within the EU over the past years.  As the EU continues 
to examine the implications of further enlargement, the trade displacement effects should be 
a factor in each member’s endorsement of future enlargement. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: Equations for the four-country Ricardian Model. 
The following equations define the percentage change in the crossover goods.  
zf =  1α ,τf + Ωh. 
zf =  1α ,τf% − τf% + Ωh. 
zf% =  1α ,τf' − τf' + Ωh. 
zf' =  1α ,−τf + Ωh. 
zfP =  1α − α% ,−τf% + Ωh − Ωh%. 
zfR =  1α − α% ,τf'% − τf' + Ωh − Ωh%. 
zfT =  1α − α% ,τf% − τf + Ωh − Ωh%. 
zfV =  1α − α% ,τf% + Ωh − Ωh%. 
zfX =  1α% − α' ,−τf'% +Ωh% − Ωh'. 
zf4 =  1α% − α' ,τf' − τf% + Ωh% − Ωh'. 
zf =  1α% − α' ,τf' − τf% + Ωh% − Ωh'. 
zf =  1α% − α' ,τf%' + Ωh% − Ωh'. 
The trade balance equations, restated in percentage change form, are 
0 =  -̂ + ¡ℓ£ − ]£¤ +  -̂ + ¡ℓ£% −]£%¤ +  %%-̂% + %¡ℓ£' −]£'¤ +  ',1 −  − 
− %.	-̂' 
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0 =  TT-̂T + T¡]£ − ℓ£¤ −  ''-̂' − '¡]£ − ℓ£¤ +  RR-̂R + R¡ℓ£' +]£ − ℓ£ − ]£'¤ −  %%-̂%
− %¡ℓ£' + ]£ − ℓ£ − ]£'¤ +  PP-̂P + P¡ℓ£% + ]£ − ℓ£ − ]£%¤ −  -̂
− ¡ℓ£% + ]£ − ℓ£ − ]£%¤ +  VV-̂V −  -̂ 
0 =  XX-̂X +  44-̂4 − 4¡]£' − ℓ£'¤ +  -̂ − ¡ℓ£ + ]£' − ℓ£' − ]£¤ +  -̂
+ ,ℓ£% + ]£' − ℓ£' −]£%.	 
With the coefficients defined as: 
¥* = /A+*A- 0/ -+*0 ,				¦ = 2,3,4	;	¥* < 0 
  = AA- - 	p©ª	z = 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8	;	  > 0 
 * = /AA-*0 -*1 −  	p©ª	¦ = 9,10,11,12	;	 * > 0 
 = ,-. ℓ ]⁄ > 0 
 = ,-. ℓ% ]%⁄ > 0 
% = ,-%. ℓ' ]'⁄ > 0 
' = ,-'. ℓ ]⁄ > 0 
P = ,-P. ℓ%] ℓ]%⁄ > 0 
R = ,-R. ℓ'] ℓ]'⁄ > 0 
T = ,-T.] ℓ⁄ > 0 
V = ,-V. > 0 
X = 1 − ,-X. > 0 
4 = ¡1 − ,-4.¤]' ℓ'⁄ > 0 
 = ¡1 − ,-.¤ ℓ]' ℓ']⁄ > 0 
 = 1 − X − 4 −  > 0 
 = ,-. > 0 
 = ,-. ℓ%] ℓ]%⁄ > 0 
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% = ,-%. ℓ'] ℓ]'⁄ > 0 
Substitution of the crossover goods into trade balance equations yields: 
±+ ² uy 3 ³| ´  µ ¶
]£]£%]£'· =
¹¸¹
¹¹
¹¹
¹¹
¹¹
¹¹
¹¹
º 9 » 79 » 79% »% 7%9' »' 7'9P »P 7P9R »R 7R9T »T 7T9V »V 7V9X94999%9'9P
»X»4»»»%»'»P
7X74777%7'7P¼½
½½
½½
½½
½½
½½
½½
½¾
¿
¹¸¹
¹¹
¹¹
¹¹
¹¹
¹¹
¹¹
¹º ℓ
£ℓ£%ℓ£'D̂D̂%D̂'D̂D̂%D̂'D̂%D̂%D̂%'D̂'D̂'D̂'%¼½
½½
½½
½½
½½
½½
½½
½½
¾
 
Where 
+ = 1¥ ;,  − ¥. +   +  %% +  ',1 −  −  − %.< < 0 
² = − < 0 
u = −% < 0 
y =  1¥ − ¥% ÀT¡ T + ,¥ − ¥%.¤ + R¡ R + ,¥ − ¥%.¤ + P¡ P + ,¥ − ¥%.¤ + V VÁ
− 1¥ ;', ' + ¥. + %, % + ¥. + ,  + ¥. +  < > 0 
3 = − 1¥ − ¥% ÀV V − T T + R R + P¡ P + ,¥ − ¥%.¤ − ,¥ − ¥%.Á < 0 
³ = −R + % < 0 
| = − < 0 
´ =  1¥% − ¥' ÀX X − 4 4 +   + ¡  + ,¥% − ¥'.¤Á > 0 
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 = − 1¥ − ¥% ÀX X + 4¡ 4 + ,¥ − ¥%.¤ + ¡  + ,¥ − ¥%.¤ + ¡  + ,¥ − ¥%.¤Á
< 0 
9 = − < 0 
9 = − < 0 
9% = −% < 0 
9' = 1¥  ',1 −  −  − %. < 0 
9P = 0 
9R = 0 
9T = − 1¥   
9V = 0 
9X = 0 
94 = − 1¥   
9 = 1¥   
9 = 0 
9% = − 1¥  %% 
9' = 1¥  %% 
9P = 0 
» = T − ' + R − % + P −  > 0 
» = −P +  < 0 
»% = −R + % < 0 
»' =  1¥ − ¥% T T − 1¥ ' ' > 0 
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»P = − 1¥ − ¥% T T < 0 
»R = 0 
»T = 1¥   < 0 
»V = − 1¥ − ¥% V V < 0 
»X = 0 
»4 = 1¥   < 0 
» =  1¥ − ¥% P P − 1¥   > 0 
» = 0 
»% = 1¥  %% < 0 
»' =  1¥ − ¥% R R − 1¥ % % > 0 
»P = − 1¥ − ¥% R R < 0 
7 =  > 0 
7 =  > 0 
7% = −4 −  −  < 0 
7' = 0 
7P =  1¥% − ¥' 4 4 > 0 
7R = − 1¥% − ¥' 4 4 < 0 
7T = 0 
7V =  1¥% − ¥'   > 0 
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7X = − 1¥% − ¥'   < 0 
74 = 0 
7 = 0 
7 = − 1¥% − ¥'   < 0 
7% = 0 
7' = 0 
7P =  1¥% − ¥' X X > 0 
 
 
  
133 
 
Appendix II: Top ten sources of imports for selected countries (Value in $B) 
France  Netherlands 
Rank  Value Share Rank  Value Share 
1 Germany 113.90 16.4% 1 Germany 95.21 19.2% 
2 Belgium 59.13 8.5% 2 Belgium 49.94 10.1% 
3 Italy 56.494 8.1% 3 USA 39.95 8.1% 
4 China 45.46 6.5% 4 China 36.83 7.4% 
5 Spain 45.31 6.5% 5 United Kingdom 31.27 6.3% 
6 USA 38.29 5.5% 6 France 24.87 5.0% 
7 United Kingdom 33.67 4.8% 7 Russian Federation 19.20 3.9% 
8 Netherlands 28.17 4.1% 8 Japan 13.98 2.8% 
9 Russian Federation 20.15 2.9% 9 Norway 12.56 2.5% 
10 Switzerland 15.69 2.3% 10 Italy 11.73 2.4% 
SUM  456.32 65.7% SUM  335.59 67.8% 
 
   
 
   
Germany  Spain 
Rank  Value Share Rank  Value Share 
1 Netherlands 105.97 8.8% 1 Germany 58.37 13.9% 
2 France 98.29 8.2% 2 France 46.50 11.1% 
3 China 86.71 7.2% 3 Italy 32.18 7.7% 
4 Italy 67.80 5.6% 4 China 30.27 7.2% 
5 USA 67.63 5.6% 5 United Kingdom 19.24 4.6% 
6 United Kingdom 65.13 5.4% 6 USA 16.70 4.0% 
7 Belgium 58.72 4.9% 7 Netherlands 15.90 3.8% 
8 Russian Federation 52.84 4.4% 8 Portugal 13.74 3.3% 
9 Austria 48.70 4.0% 9 Russian Federation 11.07 2.6% 
10 Switzerland 46.35 3.8% 10 Belgium 10.52 2.5% 
SUM  698.18 58.0% SUM  254.55 60.8% 
 
   
 
   
Italy  U.K. 
Rank  Value Share Rank  Value Share 
1 Germany 86.763 15.7% 1 Germany 82.23 13.0% 
2 France 46.98 8.5% 2 USA 55.24 8.7% 
3 China 34.62 6.3% 3 China 50.00 7.9% 
4 Netherlands 28.12 5.1% 4 Netherlands 46.35 7.3% 
5 Spain 21.63 3.9% 5 France 43.83 6.9% 
6 Libya 21.29 3.8% 6 Norway 37.45 5.9% 
7 Belgium 20.98 3.8% 7 Belgium 29.27 4.6% 
8 USA 17.20 3.1% 8 Italy 25.68 4.1% 
9 Switzerland 16.59 3.0% 9 Ireland 22.17 3.5% 
10 United Kingdom 15.87 2.9% 10 Spain 18.91 3.0% 
SUM  310.09 56.0% SUM  411.18 65.1% 
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Appendix III:  Expanded regression equation for gravity model: 
wtm = u + ?|y}}ut + ?}~}t + %?|y}}utm + '?}~}tm + P?ysm 
+4,yXTqXX + 4,y44q4 + 4,%y4%q4P + 4,'y4Rq4V 
+,4ym + ,4yom + %,4ytÂmo 
+,ymyXTqXX + ,ymy44q4 + ,%ymy4%q4P + ,'ymy4Rq4V 
+,yomyXTqXX + ,yomy44q4 + ,%yomy4%q4P + ,'yomy4Rq4V 
+%,ytÂmoyXTqXX + %,ytÂmoy44q4 + %,%ytÂmoy4%q4P + %,'ytÂmoy4Rq4V 
+tm 
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Appendix IV: OLS results for estimation of entire sample (*,**, and *** represent 
significance at the 90%,95%, and 99% levels, respectively) 
 
  OLS OLS with robust SE 
  Coeff SE   Coeff SE   
ln POP e 0.830 0.012 **   0.830 0.013 ** 
ln POP i 0.769 0.022 **   0.769 0.022 ** 
ln GDPPC e 0.715 0.016 **   0.715 0.015 ** 
ln GDPPC i 1.004 0.063 **   1.004 0.062 ** 
ln DIST -0.848 0.019 **   -0.848 0.021 ** 
DG1 -0.728 0.082 **   -0.728 0.081 ** 
DG2 0.189 0.094 **   0.189 0.073 ** 
DG3 0.102 0.083     0.102 0.075   
DY1 0.010 0.074     0.010 0.064   
DY2 0.127 0.071     0.127 0.066   
DY3 0.429 0.072 **   0.429 0.069 ** 
DY4 0.728 0.072 **   0.728 0.070 ** 
DG1*DY1 0.088 0.097     0.088 0.099   
DG1*DY2 0.096 0.096     0.096 0.099   
DG1*DY3 0.167 0.096     0.167 0.100   
DG1*DY4 0.215 0.096 **   0.215 0.099 ** 
DG2*DY1 -0.028 0.124     -0.028 0.095   
DG2*DY2 -0.245 0.122 **   -0.245 0.097 ** 
DG2*DY3 -0.299 0.122 **   -0.299 0.103 ** 
DG2*DY4 -0.423 0.122 **   -0.423 0.106 ** 
DG3*DY1 -0.072 0.106     -0.072 0.095   
DG3*DY2 -0.235 0.103 **   -0.235 0.094 ** 
DG3*DY3 -0.243 0.103 **   -0.243 0.094 ** 
DG3*DY4 -0.368 0.103 **   -0.368 0.095 ** 
Const -16.404 0.828 **   -16.404 0.813 ** 
      
R-squared 0.876       0.876     
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Appendix V: OLS estimation of individual country data (*,**, and *** represent 
significance at the 90%,95%, and 99% levels, respectively) 
 
  France Germany Italy 
  Coeff SE Signif Coeff SE Signif Coeff SE Signif 
ln POP e 0.839 0.028 *** 0.808 0.023 *** 0.858 0.029 *** 
ln POP i 9.945 8.721 
 
-8.724 18.306   13.461 6.384 ** 
ln GDPPC e 0.736 0.038 *** 0.790 0.033 *** 0.624 0.039 *** 
ln GDPPC i 1.868 2.910 
 
3.935 1.926 ** 3.577 2.728   
ln DIST -0.767 0.046 *** -0.906 0.037 *** -1.296 0.051 *** 
DG1 -0.709 0.190 *** -0.715 0.170 *** -1.244 0.194 *** 
DG2 0.355 0.223 
 
-0.162 0.185   0.108 0.220   
DG3 0.178 0.193 
 
-0.296 0.169 * -0.272 0.195   
DY1 -0.171 0.215 
 
-0.212 0.193   -0.118 0.219   
DY2 -0.333 0.321 
 
-0.288 0.286   -0.064 0.345   
DY3 -0.245 0.361 
 
0.038 0.320   -0.025 0.376   
DY4 -0.185 0.458 
 
0.143 0.389   -0.053 0.473   
DG1*DY1 0.155 0.229 
 
0.153 0.195   0.030 0.231   
DG1*DY2 0.305 0.224 
 
0.186 0.191   -0.065 0.226   
DG1*DY3 0.500 0.224 ** 0.151 0.191   -0.008 0.226   
DG1*DY4 0.475 0.225 ** 0.084 0.192   0.149 0.227   
DG2*DY1 -0.022 0.290 
 
0.042 0.247   0.015 0.293   
DG2*DY2 -0.183 0.286 
 
-0.176 0.244   -0.340 0.289   
DG2*DY3 -0.260 0.286 
 
-0.247 0.244   -0.368 0.289   
DG2*DY4 -0.378 0.286 
 
-0.323 0.244   -0.500 0.289 * 
DG3*DY1 -0.054 0.250 
 
-0.028 0.213   0.021 0.252   
DG3*DY2 -0.122 0.242 
 
-0.123 0.206   -0.175 0.243   
DG3*DY3 -0.213 0.242 
 
-0.145 0.206   -0.145 0.243   
DG3*DY4 -0.343 0.241 
 
-0.238 0.205   -0.257 0.243   
Const -190.044 136.530 
 
128.009 334.495   -264.509 116.801 ** 
R-squared 0.8851 
  
0.8895     0.8744     
  Netherlands Spain UK 
  Coeff SE Signif Coeff SE Signif Coeff SE Signif 
ln POP e 0.958 0.027 *** 0.827 0.026 *** 0.703 0.027 *** 
ln POP i -6.128 10.738 
 
4.323 3.216   4.096 11.829   
ln GDPPC e 0.802 0.038 *** 0.621 0.036 *** 0.762 0.037 *** 
ln GDPPC i 3.482 2.209 
 
3.251 1.624 ** 1.042 2.420   
ln DIST -0.692 0.044 *** -0.905 0.057 *** -0.442 0.048 *** 
DG1 0.028 0.191 
 
-1.182 0.176 *** -0.567 0.186 *** 
DG2 0.056 0.220 
 
0.733 0.209 *** 0.457 0.220 ** 
DG3 0.526 0.193 *** 0.333 0.181 * 0.359 0.191 * 
DY1 -0.157 0.218 
 
-0.143 0.216   0.047 0.225   
DY2 -0.096 0.302 
 
-0.269 0.313   0.081 0.321   
DY3 0.288 0.379 
 
-0.139 0.354   0.181 0.386   
DY4 0.519 0.430 
 
-0.129 0.431   0.348 0.451   
DG1*DY1 0.032 0.226 
 
0.158 0.212   0.024 0.223   
DG1*DY2 -0.170 0.221 
 
0.352 0.208 * -0.004 0.219   
DG1*DY3 -0.188 0.221 
 
0.344 0.208 * 0.229 0.219   
DG1*DY4 -0.167 0.222 
 
0.508 0.209 ** 0.289 0.220   
DG2*DY1 -0.113 0.286 
 
-0.032 0.269   -0.035 0.283   
DG2*DY2 -0.222 0.282 
 
-0.307 0.265   -0.211 0.279   
DG2*DY3 -0.367 0.282 
 
-0.385 0.265   -0.129 0.279   
DG2*DY4 -0.511 0.282 * -0.537 0.265 ** -0.246 0.279   
DG3*DY1 -0.048 0.248 
 
-0.095 0.231   -0.194 0.244   
DG3*DY2 -0.159 0.238 
 
-0.307 0.223   -0.370 0.236   
DG3*DY3 -0.228 0.238 
 
-0.352 0.223   -0.217 0.236   
DG3*DY4 -0.420 0.238 * -0.426 0.223 * -0.361 0.236   
Const 69.010 160.975 
 
-98.477 48.458 ** -77.660 192.642   
R-squared 0.8908 
  
0.9168     0.8715     
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Appendix VI: SUR Estimation results (*,**, and *** represent significance at the 
90%,95%, and 99% levels, respectively) 
 
  France Germany Italy 
  Coeff SE   Coeff SE   Coeff SE   
ln POP e 0.845 0.028 *** 0.824 0.024 *** 0.855 0.029 *** 
ln POP i 4.388 6.496   -6.261 13.773   8.584 5.387   
ln GDPPC e 0.756 0.038 *** 0.809 0.034 *** 0.629 0.040 *** 
ln GDPPC i 2.475 2.226   2.428 1.824   2.448 2.410   
ln DIST -0.768 0.036 *** -0.881 0.028 *** -1.194 0.037 *** 
DG1 -0.686 0.188 *** -0.620 0.171 *** -1.112 0.198 *** 
DG2 (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  
DG3 0.167 0.190   -0.239 0.171   -0.183 0.199   
DY1 -0.154 0.203   -0.152 0.190   -0.054 0.214   
DY2 -0.282 0.292   -0.150 0.277   0.083 0.319   
DY3 -0.091 0.344   0.184 0.306   0.217 0.361   
DY4 0.065 0.435   0.387 0.379   0.309 0.456   
DG1*DY1 0.154 0.225   0.150 0.200   0.024 0.236   
DG1*DY2 0.301 0.221   0.179 0.196   -0.073 0.232   
DG1*DY3 0.495 0.221 ** 0.144 0.196   -0.017 0.232   
DG1*DY4 0.468 0.222 ** 0.075 0.197   0.139 0.232   
DG2*DY1 (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  
DG2*DY2 (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  
DG2*DY3 (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  
DG2*DY4 (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  
DG3*DY1 -0.048 0.247   -0.011 0.220   0.012 0.259   
DG3*DY2 -0.127 0.238   -0.127 0.211   -0.177 0.249   
DG3*DY3 -0.216 0.238   -0.147 0.211   -0.146 0.249   
DG3*DY4 -0.345 0.238   -0.239 0.211   -0.258 0.249   
Const -96.992 105.237   97.480 255.123   -167.178 103.642   
R-squared 0.856     0.867     0.836     
  Netherlands Spain UK 
  Coeff SE   Coeff SE   Coeff SE   
ln POP e 0.952 0.028 *** 0.828 0.027 *** 0.694 0.028 *** 
ln POP i -8.589 8.173   1.463 2.579   -16.151 9.500 * 
ln GDPPC e 0.801 0.039 *** 0.626 0.037 *** 0.758 0.038 *** 
ln GDPPC i 3.752 1.655 ** 3.947 1.406 *** 4.678 2.109 ** 
ln DIST -0.677 0.041 *** -0.901 0.043 *** -0.413 0.050 *** 
DG1 0.027 0.194   -1.174 0.181 *** -0.569 0.191 *** 
DG2 (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  
DG3 0.530 0.196 *** 0.335 0.184 * 0.376 0.195 * 
DY1 -0.144 0.221   -0.186 0.210   -0.109 0.225   
DY2 -0.053 0.312   -0.310 0.298   -0.177 0.323   
DY3 0.363 0.381   -0.081 0.349   -0.033 0.399   
DY4 0.591 0.445   0.034 0.427   0.310 0.478   
DG1*DY1 0.032 0.230   0.158 0.217   0.026 0.227   
DG1*DY2 -0.168 0.226   0.350 0.213   -0.001 0.223   
DG1*DY3 -0.186 0.226   0.342 0.213   0.232 0.223   
DG1*DY4 -0.165 0.227   0.505 0.214 ** 0.289 0.224   
DG2*DY1 (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  
DG2*DY2 (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  
DG2*DY3 (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  
DG2*DY4 (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  (omitted) 
 
  
DG3*DY1 -0.047 0.253   -0.073 0.238   -0.090 0.249   
DG3*DY2 -0.153 0.243   -0.308 0.229   -0.361 0.240   
DG3*DY3 -0.222 0.243   -0.353 0.229   -0.209 0.240   
DG3*DY4 -0.415 0.243 * -0.427 0.229 * -0.353 0.240   
Const 107.062 126.033   -55.087 40.664   247.975 156.145   
R-squared 0.863     0.887     0.834     
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